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ABSTRACT 
 
Lesotho general elections have been characterised by illegitimate conflicts since pre-
independence elections in 1965. These conflicts have had a detrimental effect on the 
country’s already weak economy and have sometimes claimed human lives. While it does 
not, in and of itself, constitute a sufficient political condition for democracy, elections are 
a critical ingredient in this political system. It is therefore important that elections held 
are free and fair, and the results are accepted by all the stakeholders. Due to the 
ambiguity of the concept of ‘free and fair elections’, several regional, continental and 
international bodies came up with the guidelines of what is to qualify as free and fair 
elections. Despite being mostly declared as free and fair by the observers, Lesotho’s 
elections have never been accepted by all participants.  
 
This research sought to understand the nature of election-related conflict and what needs 
to be done to arrest the eruption of such conflict in Lesotho. It sought the opinions of 
selectively respondents who have been involved in the conflicts in different ways. The 
interviews and documented literature revealed that what constitutes a background to 
election-related conflict involves issues that are many and varied. Among others such 
issues include the following: weak political institutions, use of vulgar language by 
political leadership, and the weak economy that intensifies neo-patrimonial tendencies.  
 
The research concluded that all the factors associated with the eruption of illegitimate 
conflicts during and after general elections in Lesotho are a result of the politicians’ 
desire to retain or capture national resources to satisfy their selfish interests and those of 
their cronies. The conflicts could be minimised if the country’s economy could be 
transformed to provide the politicians with alternatives of economic survival outside the 
structures of government. Furthermore, to minimise the conflict, the country should 
consider establishing electoral courts. These have the potential of speeding up the 
resolution of electoral grievances, in the process preventing them from graduating into 
serious conflicts.  
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CHAPTER 1: RESEARCH PROBLEM AND LITERATURE 
RIVIEW 
 
1.1. Background and outline of research problem 
Apart from the pre-independence elections of 1965, Lesotho has held general 
elections on five occasions. The first post-independence election was held in 
1970 and the next in 1993 after more than two decades of authoritarian rule. 
After the country‟s return to democracy in 1993, Basotho went to the polls in 
1998, 2002, and 2007. The outcomes of all elections, however, have been 
contested, leading in some cases to bloody conflicts between the losers and the 
winners. These conflicts reached a peak when, in 1998, they went out of control 
and the government sought military intervention from Botswana and South Africa. 
The conflicts have claimed human lives and had a detrimental effect on the 
country‟s already weak economy.  
 
The country‟s political leadership made efforts to address the conflicts. The most 
notable two being the establishment of the Independent Electoral Commission 
(IEC) in 1997 and the adoption – with the external assistance within the 
framework of a political structure styled the Interim Political Authority (IPA) - of a 
Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral model in 2002. These efforts have, 
however, not produced a lasting solution to Lesotho‟s election-related conflict as 
problems persist. Many lives have been lost and property destroyed as a result of 
these conflicts since the first general election in 1965. Some of the statistics of 
lives lost during general elections form part of the sections of this thesis where 
each of the general elections is discussed.  
 
Election-related conflict violates the very human liberties supposed to be 
protected in democracies. Lesotho, like other countries aspires to one day 
becoming a consolidated democracy. However, with every election held 
accompanied by conflict as has been the case until 2007 that aspiration looks a 
distant dream. As will be read in the next sections, the conflict reached its peak in 
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1998, subsided in 2002, but rose again in 2007. The question stakeholders need 
to ask is: What is it that the country fails to do right? It was as desire to 
understand the nature of these conflict this study was conducted.  
 
1.1.1 Research questions and objectives 
The aim of this study has been to search for a thorough understanding of what 
political conflict is, and how it relates to elections in Lesotho. The understanding 
of the nature of this conflict will help not only those directly involved in the 
conflicts, but also those who make policies aimed at bringing peace and 
tranquillity to the Kingdom of Lesotho. This understanding was sought by trying 
to find answers to the following questions: 
1. What is political conflict? When is it unacceptable? When has this 
manifested itself in Lesotho 
2. What is the history of electoral institutions in Lesotho? How does this 
relate to the history of conflict? 
3. What, according to the key actors, needs doing to further reduce election-
related conflict in Lesotho? 
 
Objectives: 
The specific objectives of the study were to: 
 
1. Define political conflict, both as legitimate and illegitimate politics 
2. Outline the history of elections and electoral institutions in Lesotho. 
3. Explore the history of election-related conflict in order to identify the 
causes of conflict. 
4. Identify what, according to the key actors, needs to be done to reduce 
election-related conflict. 
5. Provide general conclusions emanating from the research then make 
recommendations to policy makers and stakeholders. 
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1.2. Literature Review 
This section provides an overview of the existing literature concerning election-
related conflicts in Lesotho. It first examines the evolution of election-related 
conflict in the country before highlighting some of the areas around which conflict 
has centred in the past. The literature review examined served as a guide and 
framework of the study; and as a source of secondary data.  
 
1.2.1. Lesotho as a Nation-State 
Lesotho is a small Kingdom completely surrounded by the Republic of South 
Africa. Lesotho was formerly a protectorate of the Great Britain. It gained its 
independence on October 4, 1966. On attaining independence, Lesotho adopted 
political features similar to those found in Great Britain. Firstly, Lesotho is a 
constitutional monarchy where the king is the head of state and the prime 
minister is the head of government. Secondly, as in Britain, Lesotho has a 
bicameral legislature made of the lower house (National Assembly) and the 
upper house (Senate). Members of the lower house are elected directly by the 
citizens. The upper house is composed of the 22 principal chiefs who are 
permanent members, and 11 other members nominated by the king (Pule, 2002). 
Until the 1998 general elections Lesotho used the constituency-based FPTP 
electoral model; this model was dropped for the MMP in 2002 (Matlosa, 2008). 
 
1.2.2.. Evolution of election-related conflicts in Lesotho 
This section concerns itself with the evolution of election-related conflict in 
Lesotho and examines how conflict manifested itself in each election held from 
the pre-independence general election to the most recent in 2007.  
 
1.2.2.1. Pre-independence election – 1965 
In 1965 Basotho voted for the first time in a general election. The election was to 
determine a party to which Britain would hand over power at independence a 
year later. The elections were won narrowly by the Basotho National Party (BNP) 
which captured 31 of 60 seats contested. The Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) 
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took 25, the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP) got four seats (Mahao, 1997: 6). 
One point to note about the 1965 election results is that the BNP did not only 
have a slim majority in parliament, but also won with a minority vote in that it 
managed to win only 42 percent of the national vote. The two losing parties 
rejected the election outcome, claiming the elections were rigged, and demanded 
a government of national unity that would prepare for fresh elections (Pule 2002: 
173). Later, in June 1966, the two losing parties refused to sign the final 
document granting Lesotho independence at the Independence Conference held 
in Britain while the King reluctantly signed (ibid).  
 
The two parties‟ rejection of the election outcome was to be followed by bitter 
conflict that claimed 10 lives as the BNP used the state to call off the gathering 
organised by the two losing parties (Makoa, 2002). Working in concert with the 
King, the two parties had organised a gathering at Thaba-Bosiu in which he was 
to be the main speaker. The BNP government viewed the gathering as one of the 
measures through which the King and the opposition parties attempted to 
destabilise, and ultimately to unseat it (Pule 2002). The alliance of the King and 
the BCP was strange in that the latter had always been hostile to the monarchy 
and chieftainship. The King had entered this strange alliance as he was not 
satisfied that under the new constitution he was to become a constitutional 
monarch, which would deny him political powers he aspired to possess. As 
shown by future events, this rejection of election results by the two parties, 
coupled with the involvement of the King in election-related conflict, had set the 
stage for the instability that was to characterise Lesotho‟s politics for decades. 
 
1.2.2.2. The 1970 General Election 
The first post-independence general election in Lesotho took place in 1970, four 
years after Lesotho was granted independence by Britain. However, the 
preparations favoured the ruling BNP. Highlighting some of the biases of the 
preparations, Khaketla (1971: 193) states that „following the scrapping of 1965 
electoral law and its replacement by that of 1968, the candidate deposit was 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
raised from R50, the fee paid in 1965, to R200‟. This was a hefty amount by 
Lesotho standards. While this arrangement created problems for opposition 
parties who struggled to raise such monies, it was not the case with the ruling 
party as it had access to the public purse. Furthermore, opposition parties were 
disadvantaged by the time-frame for the submission of nomination forms. The 
candidates were given seven days to collect the nomination papers, learn how to 
fill them in, and to submit them to the nomination courts (Khaketla 1971:203). To 
be valid, the papers had to be signed by the secretary-general and the chairman 
of the party (ibid). This was obviously problematic to the opposition parties 
because of the terrain of the country and unreliable transport and communication 
systems. The same could, however, not be said about the ruling BNP which had 
full access to the government‟s vehicles and communication channels such as 
the national radio station and telecommunications systems.   
 
In spite of the hindrance brought by the exorbitant fees to the opposition parties, 
and the failure of the Chief Electoral Officer to adequately address the 
grievances, polling finally took place on Tuesday 27 January. Voting took place in 
a peaceful atmosphere, the feat confirmed by the Prime Minister, Leabua 
Jonathan, on the state radio on January 28 and 29 (Khaketla 1971: 207). The 
results were made public to the nation through the state radio as soon as they 
were received from constituencies by the Electoral Office. However, when both 
the ruling BNP and the opposition BCP were tied at 23 constituencies apiece, the 
Prime Minister made an announcement declaring a state of emergency, citing 
intimidation during elections and the need to maintain law as driving reasons 
behind his unexpected step (Pule 2002: 175). By declaring the state of 
emergency, Jonathan made a strategy to hold on to the political power that he 
looked about to lose because of the eminent loss of elections. The trend had 
shown that the BCP was going to win the remaining constituencies. According to 
Breytenbach the final result would have been as follows: BCP 35 seats; BNP 23 
seats; and MFP two seats (1975: 108).  
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The Prime Minister‟s claim of intimidation during the elections came as a surprise 
to the nation as he had earlier made an announcement to the contrary. Apart 
from the annulment of the election, Jonathan „declared the state of emergency, 
suspended the constitution, suspended the judiciary, put the then King 
Moshoeshoe II under house arrest, arrested opposition leaders, and banned the 
Communist Party of Lesotho (CPL)‟ (Matlosa, 1997: 95). Jonathan‟s drastic steps 
proved to be a catalyst for political conflict that became violent at times. With 
opposition parties protesting over the annulment of elections on one hand, and 
the ruling party defending its actions on another, the country was embroiled in a 
political animosity that characterised the subsequent sixteen years of BNP‟s one-
party-rule and beyond. The dictatorial tendencies that followed the annulment of 
elections, particularly the arrest of opposition leaders drove BCP leadership into 
exile. It was in exile the BCP was able to organize (with the assistance of South 
Africa) a guerrilla army, the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) Makoa (2002). The 
LLA launched sporadic attacks on Lesotho from South Africa in a guerrilla war 
that lasted six years from 1979 to 1985. During this period much infrastructure 
was bombed by the LLA and lives were lost as Lesotho armed forces engaged 
the BCP‟S guerrilla army. The events that followed the 1970 elections brought to 
Lesotho a serious polarity that endures today. Lesotho‟ politics remains polarised 
with the Nationalist faction (those aligned to BNP) on one extreme and the 
Congress faction (aligned to BCP and its breakaway parties) on another. 
 
The one-party rule of the BNP came to an end on the 20th January 1986 when 
the army staged a coup detat, replacing civilian dictatorship by military 
dictatorship. Immediately after the coup, the military regime suppressed all the 
political activity through the Political Activities Order (No. 4). The reign of military 
regime was, however, not without challenges. Among others, the regime was 
soon faced with a problem of financing some of its obligations. Mahao notes that 
„since 1986 the thaw in relations between the governments of Lesotho and South 
Africa, and especially the former‟s persecution of South African Liberation 
movements personnel at the behest of the latter had led many donor countries 
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and agencies to reconsider their aid disbursements to Lesotho‟ (1997:3). The 
above coupled with the world recession, mismanagement of state resources, and 
growing numbers of the expelled or retrenched Basotho miners intensified 
economic hardships and drastically swelled the growing numbers of the army of 
the unemployed (ibid). The subdued political and economic situation generated a 
mood potentially explosive towards the regime with number of civil society 
organizations confronting the regime. In response, the regime usually intensified 
repression and this necessitated a need for a political change. The regime finally 
bowed to the pressure and returned power to the civilians through the democratic 
election of 1993. This election forms part of the discussion in the next section.  
 
1.2.2.3. 1993 General Election 
The second post-independence election followed in 1993. This followed the 23 
years of authoritarian rule, 16 of the BNP‟s one party rule and seven of the 
military interregnum. It is understandable the election was likely to cause 
excitement in the nation considering the long period of democratic absence. As 
with the previous general elections, preparation for the 1993 general election 
became the responsibility of the incumbent government through the Electoral 
Office, which used to be headed by personnel seconded by foreign countries. 
This arrangement was later to be one of the most serious issues around which 
electoral conflict was centred. Polling finally took place on the 27th March and 
when the results were published it emerged that the BCP had won all the 65 
constituencies with an overall 75% of the votes cast as seen in Table 1. The 
BCP‟s landslide victory was interpreted by many observers as the „righting of the 
1970 wrong‟ when the party was denied its rightful claim to state power (Southall 
& Petlane 2005, read in Matlosa 2008; Mahao, 1997). In spite of being voted for 
by 22.6 % of national voters, the BNP did not win a single seat in the legislature. 
This was all because of the First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral model.  
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Table 1: The Election results of 1993 
 
Party Votes cast Share of votes Seats won 
BCP 398 355 74.7 65 
BNP 120 686 22.6 0 
KBP 417 0.078 0 
LEP 63 0.011 0 
LLP 244 0.045 0 
MFP 7 650 1.43 0 
NIP 241 0.045 0 
PFD 947 0.17 0 
UDP 582 0.10 0 
INDEPENDENTS 2 753 0.51 0 
TOTAL 532 678 100% 65 
Source: Sekatle (1999: 41) 
 
Following the humiliating loss to its bitter rival the BCP, the BNP claimed „the 
elections were rigged and challenged the results in the courts of law‟ (Kadima, 
1999: 76). Attempts to reverse the results through courts of law failed and the 
BNP engaged in protests that threatened the country‟s political stability, and led 
to loss of life. The protests reached their peak when, after a petition was 
delivered to his palace by members of opposition parties, King Letsie III 
dissolved the BCP government on August 17, 1994 claiming he had been 
„petitioned by thousands of Basotho on 15th August to take this action‟ (Mothibe 
1999: 49; Pule 2002: 202). Some of the reasons provided by the King for 
dissolving the BCP government are found in the contents of the letter he wrote to 
the Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle. Part of the letter reads: 
 
You will no doubt have borne witness to the deteriorating political situation 
in the country and the tension generated nationwide. For the sake of 
peace, stability, reconciliation and unity of the Basotho nation, it has been 
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found prudent to relieve you of your responsibilities as Prime Minister of 
Lesotho with immediate effect (Pule 2002: 203) 
 
A number of lives was lost during the skirmishes that followed what came to be 
popularly known as the “Palace Coup”; „order and normalcy were compromised 
when the Lesotho Council of NGOs (LCN) led two strikes to force the King to 
restore the (elected) BCP government‟ (Selinyane, 1999: 41). The BCP 
government was later restored after diplomatic intervention by South Africa, 
Zimbabwe and Botswana, and the subsequent signing of a Memorandum of 
Understanding by the King and the BCP. Among others the King and the BCP 
agreed to the re-installing of former King Moshoeshoe II, something that the BCP 
government had long rejected. It is common knowledge that King Letsie III had 
always been a reluctant monarch who would happily hand the reigns of power to 
his father if afforded a chance (Transformation Resource Centre Lesotho, 15 
September 2009). It is also common knowledge that the BCP government had 
not only rejected, but made mockery of the issue whenever it was raised in 
parliament. For instance, it was common then to hear BCP MPs making insulting 
statements during parliamentary radio broadcasts, comparing the former king to 
a castrated bull that had lost its testicles and could not get them back. Failure by 
the BCP government to adequately address the issue of re-instalment of King 
Letsie III’s father to his former throne rendered the relationship between the King 
and the BCP government volatile. It is on the basis of this that one can safely 
infer that the King simply found the BNP‟s petition – that he claimed to dissolve 
the BCP government on the basis of - as a convenient platform from which to 
launch an attack in order to get rid of the hostile BCP government.  
 
1.2.2.4. 1998 General Election 
The next election followed in 1998. This came shortly after a split in the 1993 
victors – BCP, following internal factional battles and the resultant formation of 
the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) in parliament in June 1997. The 
formation of the LCD in parliament relegated the BCP to official opposition. The 
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then leader of the BCP and Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle had on Monday, June, 
9 held a press conference in the National Assembly in which he made the 
following announcement:  
 
…I announce the formation of a new political party, which shall be known 
as the Lesotho Congress for Democracy. The main objective of this new 
party as the name implies, will be to deepen and to foster democratic rule 
in Lesotho. Because we have the support of the majority of 
parliamentarians, there will be no change in government. We wish those 
members in parliament who will remain with the BCP success in their new 
role as the official opposition in parliament…. (TV Lesotho, 9 June 1997, 
read in Pule, 1997: 22). 
 
The legitimacy and legality of the newly formed LCD government formed a centre 
of debate for politicians and academics alike. Some sections of the population, 
particularly those political parties that sympathised with the BCP, claimed that 
Mokhehle‟s actions were illegitimate. Other sections of the population found 
nothing wrong with the formation of the new party. The view of the latter section 
is reflected in Sekatle‟s argument that: 
 
political analysts and constitutional lawyers contend that the Prime 
Minister‟s move does not constitute a breach of Lesotho‟s constitution 
because he is “the leader of the political party that commands the support 
of the majority of members of the National Assembly” as it is required by 
the constitution (1997: 74) 
 
The formation of the LCD and its sudden rise to government became a very 
contentious issue around which the conflicts were to be centred. The formation of 
the LCD united sworn enemies, the BCP and the BNP who together called on the 
King to dissolve the LCD-dominated parliament and form a government of 
national unity (Kadima, 1999: 76). The King did not heed the protesters‟ call and 
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a tense atmosphere prevailed until the eve of the May 1998 election (ibid). 
Polling finally took place on May 23, 1998. It is important to note that unlike all 
previous elections, the 1998 elections were administered by the Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC) formed late in 1997. Prior to the polling day, the 
three opposition parties BNP, BCP and MFP applied to the High Court for a  
postponement of elections on the grounds that the IEC had failed to provide them 
with the provisional voters‟ roll. The court ruled in favour of the applicants, but 
ruled it did not have the power to postpone the election, as such power rested 
only with the king. The elections thus went ahead.  
 
The results showed the LCD had unexpectedly won 78 of the 79 constituencies 
up for grabs on polling day; one went to the BNP. Voting had been postponed in 
the Moyeni constituency due to the death of one of the candidates. The 
constituency was later won by the LCD.  The implication of the results was that 
the LCD had 99% of in parliament seats in spite of winning only 60.5% of the 
national vote (Southall, 2003: 288). This distribution of seats reflected what 
Mahao has called the ‟absurdity of the backward first-past-the post electoral 
model to which Lesotho was still hanging inspite (sic) of being rejected by many 
jurisdictions turning towards democratic rule‟ (1997: 6). Table 2 shows the results 
of the 1998 general elections. 
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Table 2: The results of the 1998 general elections  
Party Votes cast Share of votes (as 
a percentage of 
the national vote) 
Seats won 
LCD 364 290 60.6 78 
BCP 63 445 10.6 0 
BNP 146 566 24.4 1 
CPD 1 185 0.20 0 
KBP 174 0.03 0 
LEP 92 0.02 0 
LLP/UDP 357 0.06 0 
MFP 7 546 1.27 0 
NIP 1 644 0.28 0 
NPP 2 897 0.49 0 
PFD 3 077 0.52 0 
SDU 3 160 0.20 0 
INDEPENDENTS 6 536 1.10 0 
TOTAL 593 955 100% 79 
Source: Sekatle (1999:41) 
*Total number of seats is 79 and not 80 because voting did not take place in Moyeni because of 
the death of one of the candidates. 
 
  
Three opposition parties namely BCP, BNP, and MFP refused to recognise the 
LCD government because, they alleged, it had won the elections fraudulently 
(Mothibe, 1999). The three challenged the authenticity of the election results in 
the courts and as their challenges failed they organised a march to the Royal 
Palace on August 4, 1998. After handing their petition, the protesters refused to 
leave the palace gates. Instead they organised a sit-in that was to last more than 
a month until it was dispersed by the South African National Defence Force 
(SANDF) on the morning of September 22, 1998.  
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The sit-in witnessed recurring clashes between protesters and police that 
claimed not fewer than 10 lives (Makoa, 1999). As time passed and frustration 
mounted, the protesters mounted pressure by seizing government vehicles and 
parking them at the palace gate (at this time known as the “Freedom Square”) 
and closing government offices and ordering civil servants to stay at home. At 
this time there was no order in Lesotho, the police had completely lost the control 
of the situation and the army was not interested in intervening. Kapa (2009: 6) 
writes that the army „declined to intervene on the grounds that this was a political 
problem that needed political leaders to resolve‟.  
 
In the few incidents when the army members did get involved in the disputes, 
they defended the protesters against the police. A classical example was on the 
evening of September 3, 1998 when the police, trying to disperse the protestors, 
exchanged fire with members of the army who were on duty at the palace. In this 
clash an opposition activist and a police officer died and 12 protesters were 
injured (Mohlanka, 11 September, 1998, quoted in Makoa, 1999). The tension 
reached new proportions when on the morning of September 22, 1998 members 
of the SANDF violently removed protesters from „Freedom Square‟. Suddenly the 
country was close to anarchy and business property in Maseru and the 
neighbouring towns of Mafeteng and Mohale‟s Hoek were looted and several set 
on fire by people who took advantage of the almost anarchical situation. More 
than a century after 1998, the effects of the riots remain visible in the towns 
affected. No serious reconstruction has taken place and most of what used to be 
big business structures remain shells. According to the ANC Daily News Briefing, 
the cost of repairing the damage to Maseru alone was estimated at around two 
billion Maloti/Rands (September 26, 1998). 
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1.2.2.5. The 2002 General Election 
Following days of unrest and disorder that intensified after the arrival of the 
SANDF, and later the Botswana Defence Force (BDF), order was gradually 
restored and the LCD took back its position as the government. The Southern 
African Development Community (SADC) member states namely South Africa, 
Botswana and Mozambique intervened diplomatically in an effort to find a 
solution to the Lesotho political crisis. It was through their efforts the Interim 
Political Authority (IPA) was formed to lay a foundation for fresh elections as a 
way to redress the conflict resulting from the 1998 elections. The electoral 
process was dully administered and polling eventually took place on May 25, 
2002 (Southall, 2003: 275). The most significant aspects of this election were the 
adoption of the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) model and the increasing of 
parliamentary seats from 80 to 120 as a way of accommodating the 40 members 
who would be elected to parliament through the proportional representation (PR) 
wing of the model.  
 
The LCD once again won the elections overwhelmingly, this time taking 77 of the 
78 constituencies contested. Polling for FPTP did not take place in two 
constituencies because of the deaths of some candidates. Southall (2003: 288) 
writes that “when the parliamentary seats were finally allocated, the ruling LCD 
was barred from securing any seat from the PR wing of the electoral model 
because it already had 77 (or 65%) of the total number of 118 (constituency + 
PR) seats being competed for on the election day (or twelve more seats than 
their proportional entitlement)”. The remaining 41 seats were shared among nine 
opposition parties. This was seen as a milestone by many observers as, for the 
first time in its history, Lesotho was having an inclusive parliament of 10 political 
parties, with the BNP as the main opposition with 21 seats (Kabemba 2006: 21).  
 
Contrary to expectations, this development did not eliminate, but merely 
minimised protests over the election results as the protests continued to surface, 
albeit less frequently. This became evident when the BNP once again rejected 
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the election results. Its leader, Major General Metsing Lekhanya, made 
„generalised complaints about electoral malpractice and alleged curious 
statistical patterns in the votes‟ (Southall, 2003: 290). Lekhanya‟s objections, 
however, soon faded as opposition parties decided it would be more meaningful 
to “fight” from within the parliament. Thus, all the opposition members took their 
share of the 41 seats and joined the parliament. 
 
In spite of the opposition parties taking up their parliamentary seats, Makoa observed 
that tension was high and conflict persisted between the members of parliament 
belonging to the ruling party and those of the opposition parties (2004: 36). This conflict 
manifested itself in several ways including financial discrimination, against opposition 
MPs. Among others, opposition parliamentarians were excluded from constituency 
allowances enjoyed by MPs who had entered parliament through FPTP; all LCD 
members but one. The general feeling among opposition members was that like the 
FPTP MPs who were entitled to constituency allowances, they (opposition MPs) also 
deserved to be paid some allowances as they too represented certain percentages of 
citizens, although not in constituencies, but country wide. It was on the basis of what 
he observed in parliament that Makoa argued that „what the new electoral arrangement 
achieved was just to transfer (not eliminate) the conflict from the street into the 
parliament‟ (ibid). It has to be noted the conflict that Makoa argued had been 
transferred into parliament was not just a conflict of ideas and opinion – usually found 
in democratic parliaments – but conflict characterised by hatred and animosity between 
members.  
 
1.2.2.6. Snap elections - 2007 
The five year parliamentary term was to end in April 2007. As this date got 
closer, a new party, the All Basotho Convention (ABC) was formed in parliament 
by 17 disgruntled MPs from the ruling LCD and one independent candidate who 
had been earlier expelled from the LCD. The formation of the ABC brought a 
significant change to the Lesotho politics. Firstly, it dramatically shifted the 
balance of power in parliament in that the LCD was now left with just 61 seats (or 
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a 2 seat-majority). Amid rumours of more LCD MPs‟ willingness to join the new 
party, the Prime Minister, fearing a repeat of 1997 when the newly formed LCD 
relegated the BCP to opposition, „acted swiftly and advised the King to dissolve 
parliament and call for new elections‟ (Likoti, 2008: 77). A snap election was thus 
called for February 27, 2007.  
 
Secondly, the ABC immediately occupied the position held by the BNP since 
1993 as the main challenger to the ruling party. This was attributable to ABC 
ability to attract the youth through its entertainment-filled campaign strategy, and 
disillusionment among BNP supporters as a result of power struggles within their 
party leadership. Furthermore, the ABC‟s instant popularity could be attributed to 
the charismatic character of its leader, Tom Thabane who, because of his 
successes in the ministries he headed, was known as “Mr Delivery” (Likoti, 
2009). Thus, when polling took place on the February 27, it was obvious it was 
going to be a two horse race between LCD and ABC. 
 
In an effort to strengthen their chances of winning the elections, the two main 
contenders, the LCD and the ABC, formed electoral alliances with other minor 
parties, the National Independent Party (NIP) and the Lesotho Workers Party 
(LWP) respectively. The point to note about the LCD/NIP alliance specifically was 
that it was surrounded by controversy, having been signed by the deputy leader 
of NIP, apparently behind the back of the leader and the founder of the party, 
Anthony C Manyeli. Kapa states that this faction of the NIP collaborated with the 
LCD to „forcefully kick out‟ Manyeli from his party‟s leadership as ‟he disagreed 
with them on forming the controversial alliance‟ (2008: 13). This led to acrimony 
and a split within the NIP, followed by protracted legal battles (Matlosa, 2008).  
 
The two big parties, the ABC and the LCD did not contest PR seats; they instead 
had their members included in the party lists of their smaller allies who in return 
did not contest constituency seats. The arrangement was such that members of 
the aligning parties would vote for bigger parties on the FPTP ballot paper and 
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for the smaller parties on the PR ballot paper (Matlosa 2007). The allocation of 
PR seats that resulting from this arrangement was to later become a post 
election issue on which new conflict was to centre.  
 
Election results disclosed the LCD had lost 18 out of 79 constituencies in which 
voting for the FPTP seats took place. Seventeen of these constituencies went to 
the ABC, one to the Lesotho People‟s Congress (LPC), another splinter party 
from the LCD in 2001. A point of interest about these results was that the newly 
formed ABC won all constituencies in the capital Maseru and all other urban 
constituencies but five. The LCD, however, won the remaining five urban 
constituencies and all rural constituencies except Seqonoka that went to the 
LPC. The final allocation of seats saw the LCD/NIP alliance get 82 seats and the 
ABC/LWP 27 (IEC, February 2007). However, instead of the winning alliance 
forming a governing coalition, the LCD ruled alone and the NIP took the 
opposition benches. On the other hand the ABC and the LWP remained a single 
caucus and voted together. The pact between the LCD and the NIP is the subject 
of the current dispute between the government and the opposition parties with 
the latter maintaining the former has usurped several parliamentary seats that 
belong to it (Hoeane, 2009). Table 3 shows the actual results of the February 
National Assembly Elections. 
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Table 3: The Actual Results of the February 2007 General Election 
Party Total valid 
votes 
Constituency 
seats won by 
party 
Party’s 
allocation of 
compensator
y seats  
Total number 
of seats 
% party votes % Seats won 
(constituency 
+ 
compensator
y seats) 
Alliance of 
Congress 
Parties 
20 263 1 1 2 4.6 1.7 
Basotho 
Batho 
Democratic 
Party 
8 474 0 1 1 1.9 0.8 
Basotuland 
Congress 
Party 
9 823 0 1 1 2.2 0.8 
Basotho 
Democratic 
National Party 
8 783 0 1 1 2.0 0.8 
Basotho 
National Party 
29 965 0 3 3 6.8 2.5 
Lesotho 
Workers Party 
107 463 0 10 10 24.3 8.4 
Marematlou 
Freedom 
Party 
9 129 0 1 1 2.1 0.8 
National 
Independence 
Party 
229 602 0 21 21 51.8 17.6 
New Lesotho 
Freedom 
Party 
3 984 0 0 0 0.9 0.0 
Popular Front 
for Democracy 
15 477 0 1 1 3.5 0.8 
All Basotho 
Convention 
_** 17 0 17 0.0 14.3 
Lesotho 
Congress for 
Democracy 
_** 61 0 61 0.0 51.3 
Total 442 963 79*** 40 119 100 100 
** ABC and LCD did qualify for compensatory seats, but benefited from PR seats won by LWP and NIP respectively 
***The total numbers of constituency seats and of the whole National Assembly do not add up to 80 and 120 respectively 
because the elections in Makhaleng Constituency No.45 were postponed due to the death of one of the candidates and a 
fresh election was held on Saturday 30 June 2007. The election was won by the ruling LCD 
 
Source: Matlosa 2007 
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After the allocation of seats by the IEC, „five opposition parties, namely ABC, 
BNP, MFP, Alliance of Congress Parties (ACP), and LWP protested the 
allocation of seats and called for the leader of NIP (mysteriously left out of his 
party list by the faction that got into alliance with the LCD) to be sworn in as an 
MP despite the fact that he did not contest the election‟ (Matlosa 2008: 41). This 
call was rejected by the Speaker of parliament who made it clear that only people 
who contested and won constituency seats and those who appeared on the PR 
lists of their parties could be sworn as MPs. The Opposition argued that if the 
model had been applied appropriately, the LCD/NIP alliance would have received 
a total of 62 seats as against 82.The ABC/LWP alliance, on the other hand, 
would have received 29, seats as opposed to its 27. Other smaller parties „would 
have increased their parliamentary seats through the PR component and one 
small party, the New Lesotho Freedom Party (NLFP), which is not represented in 
Parliament would have at least won one seat‟ (ibid). If the allocation had been 
applied as the opposition parties desired, the results would have been as shown 
in table 4. 
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Table 4: Hypothetical Results of the February 2007 National Assembly Elections 
Party Total 
valid 
votes 
Constituencies 
 by party 
Party’s 
allocation of 
compensatory 
seats 
Total 
number 
of seats 
% 
party 
votes 
% seats won 
(constituency 
+ 
compensatory 
seats) 
Alliance of 
Congress 
Parties 
20 263 1 4 5 4.6 4.2 
Basotho 
Batho 
Democratic 
Party 
8 474 0 2 2 1.9 1.7 
Basutoland 
Congress 
Party 
9 823 0 3 3 2.2 2.5 
Basotho 
Democratic 
National 
Party 
8 783 0 2 2 2.0 1.7 
Basotho 
National 
Party 
29 965 0 8 8 6.8 6.7 
ABC/LWP 107 463 17 12 29 24.3 24.4 
Marematlou 
Freedom 
Party 
9 129 0 3 3 2.1 2.5 
LCD/NIP 229 602 61 1 62 51.8 51.1 
New Lesotho 
Freedom 
Party 
3 984 0 1 1 0.9 0.8 
Popular 
Front for 
Democracy 
15 477 0 4 4 3.5 3.4 
Total 442 963 79** 40 119 100 100 
Source: Matlosa 2007 
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In protest, the MFP challenged this allocation of seats in the courts. In its 
application, the party had  
 
urged the High Court to declare the allocation of seats in the National 
Assembly 2007 polls as of no force and effect due to some irregularities, 
as well as declaring alliances between the Lesotho Workers party (LWP) 
and the All Basotho Convention (ABC) as well as that between, the 
National Independent Party (NIP) and Lesotho Congress for Democracy 
(LCD) null and void. Lastly the MFP sought the court to direct IEC to 
reallocate PR seats in the National Assembly (Nyaka, 2008)  
 
According to the Lesotho National Assembly Elections Order 1992 section 
104(2)(b), the High Court should have made a final order in relation to elections 
results petitions within 30 days. However, it took the High Court far more than a 
year to make a final judgment in the MFP case. The judgment came to be 
delivered only on the July 2, 2008 with the MFP eventually losing on 
technicalities. Nyaka reports that “when passing judgment, Justice Semapo 
Peete indicated that the party (MFP) has no locus standi (legal standing) as per 
Section 69 subsection (3) of the Constitution and that the High Court does not 
have jurisdiction to preside over the matter”(ibid).  
 
As time passed and no common ground was found between the LCD 
government and opposition parties, the protests gained momentum and the 
country was thrown into instability that led to regular work boycotts, particularly in 
Maseru. In response to work protests and alleged attacks on some ministers‟ 
homes, the government declared a dusk-to-dawn curfew in the capital. It was 
during this curfew that security forces went all-out to abduct and torture some of 
the key opposition figures and their sympathisers. For instance, ‟the prominent 
opposition leaders – A. C. Manyeli (NIP), V. M. Malebo (MFP), M, Billy (LWP) – 
were charged with a number of cases including high treason, defamation of 
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courts, inciting instability etc. Most of the cases have since been dismissed by 
the courts‟ (Kapa, 2008: 9).  
 
Even the ordinary civilians were not spared the wrath of the security forces‟ iron 
fist. Their rights were grossly violated during the curfew and a couple of lives lost. 
Reporting on human rights in Lesotho, the Bureau of Democracy observed that 
the “Lesotho government‟s human rights record deteriorated in 2007 due to 
government‟s response to violent attacks on senior government and political 
figures, during which security forces committed serious abuses, including 
unlawful deprivation of life, torture, and use of excessive force” (March 11, 2008). 
In one incident a university political science lecturer who is also a politics and 
development editor of the Public Eye newspaper, Nthakeng Selinyane survived 
death by a whisker when his car was shot at from behind immediately after 
leaving a roadblock manned by the security forces (Interview at Maseru 08 July 
2009). Selinyane is a well known critic of the government and has written 
extremely elections in Lesotho. One can therefore, safely assume that the 
attempt on his life was a calculated move by the security agents.  
 
As a direct result of the election-related unrests of 2007, for the first time in 
decades, Lesotho produced refugees as some of the opposition activists sought 
political asylum in South Africa. Some remain in South Africa today. One of the 
most prominent of these „refugees‟ was a retired Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) 
Warrant Officer Makotoko Lerotholi who was one of the bodyguards of Tom 
Thabane - the leader of the opposition party, the ABC. Before he fled the country, 
Lerotholi was arrested by the military and severely assaulted on suspicion he 
was involved in alleged attacks on some members of the cabinet. The 
government later came to accuse Lerotholi of being the mastermind behind the 
attacks on the Lesotho army barracks and a subsequent attack on State House, 
and the alleged attempt to assassinate Prime Minister Mosisili in April this year 
(Molomo, 2009). Lerotholi has since died in exile, allegedly as a result of the 
torture by the Lesotho army in 2007 and was buried in Maseru on Saturday 
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October 28, 2009 (Sunday Express 01/11/2009). It is worth noting Lerotholi was 
not the first “refugee” of the 2007 persecutions to die in exile. Pakiso Semoli 
earlier died in exile in 2007 (Selinyane 2009, 19). 
 
No solution has been found to the conflict in spite of it attracting regional 
attention. Following the tabling of the findings of its mission earlier sent to 
Lesotho, SADC, in a meeting convened in Dares Salaam, Tanzania, in May 
2008, appointed Sir Ketumile Masire, a former President of Botswana, to mediate 
in the feud. After more than a year of unfruitful engagements, Masire has since 
abandoned his mediation, citing lack of cooperation from the ruling LCD 
(Intelserv.co.ls). Delivering the „Talking Notes‟ of his report in Maseru on the 9th 
July 2009, Masire stated that:  
 
… although I have not concluded the Mission assigned to me by SADC, I 
do not feel able to continue on account of the approach to the matter 
taken by the Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho. This is regrettable 
because in the seminar (in which the experts of the MMP model were to 
be called to provide their opinion on the contested allocation of seats) lay 
the crucial opportunity to expertly identify the precise weaknesses in the 
application of the MMP Model in order to enable the people of Lesotho to 
make such reforms as may be considered necessary (Staff Reporter: 
Intelserv.co.ls 2009) 
 
It remains to be seen what the future holds for Lesotho as the government has 
rejected the recommendations of SADC (through Sir Ketumile Masire) over the 
allocation of seats. The Deputy Prime Minister Lesao Lehohla is reported to have 
said ‟Masire has completely gone off the rails because his mandate was to 
facilitate the dialogue over the dispute between the government and the 
opposition. … he has now exceeded that to play the role of the arbitrator with 
supposedly a final say in the matter and we find that a bit disturbing‟ (Hoeane 
2009). 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
Following the abandonment of the SADC mission by Masire and his team, the 
opposition parties insisted there was need by the IEC to review the allocation of 
seats. The ruling party insisted on its original position that re-opening the issue 
would be tantamount to undermining the courts. In an attempt to force the ruling 
party to the negotiations table, the opposition parties called for a three day work 
boycott beginning Monday August 3, 2009. Although not very successful, the 
strike was eventually called off on the second day when the parties agreed to 
begin fresh talks under the mediation of the retired Bishop Phillip Mokuku of the 
Anglican Church of Lesotho (ACL). In spite of ongoing negotiations, the leader of 
the ruling party, Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili has on several public 
gatherings maintained his party was not going to budge on its position in regard 
to the allocation of seats. He reiterated his party stance at a gathering in 
Teyateyaneng on Saturday August 8, 2009 (Hoeane 2009, 1). Following differing 
views on the contents of the ruling by Judge Semapo Peete, the parties, under 
the mediation of Bishop Mokuku, agreed to seek an independent legal opinion on 
the part of the judgment involving the allocation of seats (Linake, Intelserv. Co.ls, 
August, 20 2009). The next section examines specific areas that according to 
existing literature have proved to be the roots of election-related conflicts. 
Furthermore, it discusses some of the initiatives taken to remedy the conflicts.  
 
1.3 The roots of conflict and initiatives taken to remedy the conflict. 
This section identifies areas that the existing literature points to as those which 
over the years have proved to be a centre of election-related conflict in Lesotho. 
These include the outcomes of the elections, elections management bodies, and 
electoral models. In each area identified, initiatives taken in the past to remedy 
the situation are also examined. 
 
1.3.1. Outcomes of the elections. 
While it is clear that the whole electoral process in Lesotho is in one way or 
another characterised by conflict between the ruling and opposition parties, it is 
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mainly after the announcement of election results that the reigning conflict takes 
greater, sometimes violent, proportions. This has been the trend since pre-
independence election in 1965 when the opposition parties namely BCP and 
MFP alleged the BNP had rigged the elections. The same trend surfaced again in 
1970. In spite of arrangements favouring the ruling BNP, the electoral process 
went ahead without much strife. It was only when the results seemed to favour 
the opposing BCP that the Prime Minister began to cry foul and subsequently 
annulled the elections; a similar trend resurfaced during 1993 and 1998 
elections. However, the point to note about the 1998 elections is that the conflict 
was already visible before the polling day, the environment was already 
poisoned. This was evidenced by the opposition parties‟ decision to take part in 
the elections “under protest” after the High Court had ruled in their favour in the 
case in which they accused the IEC of not giving them sufficient time to audit 
voters lists (Pule 2002). The court had, however, stated it did not have powers to 
postpone the elections (for which the complainants had applied). Even in this 
particular case, the conflict began to intensify only after the results had indicated 
opposition parties had lost. The 2002 and 2007 general elections were no 
different in that it was also after the announcement of the election results that the 
conflict intensified. 
 
The most notable initiative to resolve the conflicts has been the engagement of 
the courts. However, the courts have seemed unable to provide the necessary 
solution. This is because more often than not, the courts decide their cases on 
the basis of determining who between the two opposing parties is guilty. This 
they do paying little regard for the consequences of their decisions, except where 
such consequences may have serious national implications. This has proved not 
to be very appropriate for political cases, as politics is never a zero-sum game 
and involves compromises. It was probably on the realisation of this that, the 
‟SADC heads of state and governments committed themselves a regional version 
of the African Union (AU) Declaration by adopting the Principles and Guidelines 
Governing Democratic Elections‟ (Menang 2006: 62). Among others, these 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
leaders committed themselves to the establishment of relevant courts to arbitrate 
electoral disputes (ibid). Lesotho is however, yet to establish such a court and 
electoral disputes continue to be heard by the normal courts.  
 
1.3.2. The Elections Management Bodies (The Electoral Office and the IEC) 
Until 1998, elections in Lesotho were administered by the Electoral Office. This 
was a government department under the Ministry of Interior (later Home Affairs). 
During elections the office usually engaged foreign “experts”. For instance during 
the 1993 elections, the office was headed by Noel Lee who was seconded to 
Lesotho by the government of Jamaica. By virtue of it being a government 
department it was clear the Electoral Office would not serve both the ruling and 
political parties equally. This first became evident during the preparations for the 
1970 elections when the then Electoral Officer, Johannes L. Pretorius, a South 
African, failed to address some of the grievances of the opposition parties in 
relation to exorbitant candidate deposits (Khaketla, 1971). Furthermore, the 
Electoral Office became a central issue after the 1993 general election. Its role 
was one of the issues being raised by the BNP when it refused to accept defeat; 
claiming the elections were rigged in favour of the BCP by the Electoral Office. 
 
Immediately after the 1993 election, the opposition parties proposed to the BCP 
government that the subsequent elections be run by an independent body. The 
BCP was, however, ‟strongly opposed to the appointment of the IEC in spite 
pressure from all other political parties‟ (Sekatle, 1997: 85). The Independent 
Electoral Commission (IEC) of Lesotho came to be established only in 1997 
through the Second Amendment to the Constitution Act, 1997. It is important to 
note that the IEC was established shortly after the formation in parliament of the 
LCD. The newly formed LCD used its majority in parliament to vote for the law 
that replaced the Electoral Office and the Delimitation Board by the IEC. This 
move can be explained as a way of enticing opposition parties, and an attempt to 
minimise their antagonistic view against the LCD. The genuineness of the move 
remains questionable because the very LCD members who voted for the 
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establishment of the commission were the same people who were against the 
idea when still in the BCP.  
 
It goes without saying that the establishment of the IEC had brought hope to the 
nation that the election results would now be accepted by all parties. However, 
this proved to be a far fetched dream as the 1998 elections, the first to be run by 
the IEC, became the most violently disputed. Subsequent conflict almost threw 
the country into a civil war. Since then, the role of the IEC has been at the centre 
of every election-related conflict. The opposition parties view the commission as 
a “comrade in crime” of the government. This is evident in that in most cases 
lodged in courts by the opposition parties the IEC becomes the first defendant 
and the government the second, or the other way round. 
 
1.3.3. The Electoral Models. 
Electoral models have also proved to be one of many issues that have triggered 
election-related conflict in Lesotho. Firstly it was the FPTP model that was used 
from 1965 to 1998. This model always produced results that were questionable in 
one way or another. Firstly, in 1965 the model allowed the BNP to form a 
government in spite of having only 42 % of the national vote; the party had won 
31 of the 60 constituencies up for grabs (Mahao, 1997). Secondly the model 
made the headlines, for the wrong reasons of course, when it „over-rewarded‟ the 
winners and „punished‟ the losers in 1993 and 1998. In 1993 the model allowed 
the BCP to take 100 % of parliamentary seats despite winning only 74 % of the 
total vote (Southall, 2003: 275). In 1998, the model made news again when it 
awarded the LCD a 98 percent parliamentary representation although it had 
scored just above only 60 % of the national vote (Kadima, 1999). The implication 
of these skewed allocations of seats was that in the two cases 25.3 %and 40 % 
of the voters were left un-represented in parliament. The weakness of the model 
was exposed when the unrepresented parties became frustrated and sometimes 
resorted to violence. 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
In an effort to remedy the weaknesses associated with the FPTP model, the 
MMP model was adopted to replace the FPTP in the 2002 general election. The 
adoption did, however, not come without struggles. It came after many struggles 
within the IPA as the LCD and the opposition parties could not easily reach 
consensus. On one hand the „opposition parties wanted a mixed model that 
swung in the form of extreme PR; on another, the LCD wanted to hang on the 
model that would retain FPTP as its fundamental basis‟ (Southall, 2003: 276). 
The final compromise favoured the LCD and the new model was to consist of 80 
FPTP and 40 PR seats. As a result of the new model, the allocation of seats in 
parliament following the 2002 general elections saw 10 parties represented in 
Lesotho‟s parliament. While the main opposition party, the BNP did dispute the 
results, and promised to take no part in any by-elections as a way of protest, 
there was no serious conflict after the 2002 elections. The model was thus hailed 
as a success and Lesotho received accolades from the international community. 
 
The model was used once more in the 2007 general elections. In an attempt to 
increase their chances of winning the elections and gaining more seats in 
parliament, the main contenders, the LCD and the ABC entered alliances with 
smaller NIP and LWP respectively. According to Matlosa, “the alliances 
effectively distorted the MMP electoral model” (2008:35). How the alliances were 
to work, together with the resultant allocation of seats have been discussed in 
detail in section1.2.2.6 and do not need repetition. It is however, important to 
emphasise that because of the distortion of this model Lesotho was once more 
thrown into violent conflict that resulted in loss of numerous lives. The conflict 
persists and it seems unlikely there will be a meaningful solution anytime in the 
near future. In an attempt to help Lesotho solve this conflict, the SADC had 
appointed Sir Ketumile Masire, a former President of Botswana as a mediator 
between the ruling LCD and the opposition parties. Masire has since abandoned 
the mission citing lack of cooperation from the Lesotho government (Staff 
Reporter: Intelserv.co.ls 2009). As seen earlier a fresh mediation process has 
begun under the leadership of Bishop Phillip Mokuku. 
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It is important to note that reforms are being planned on the MMP model as a 
way of plugging the loopholes that the political parties have taken advantage of in 
the past. Selinyane notes that, “the Law Review Committee of the IEC , which 
brings together all the registered parties, has just completed a comprehensive 
revamp of the election law, with a view to plugging the loopholes that have seen 
a series of recent national polls dogged by bitter complaints” (Public Eye, June 
19 2009). Proposed changes include that it becomes compulsory for all political 
parties to contest elections at both the constituency ballot and the party ballot of 
the MMP model; each party be bound to contest elections in a minimum of 10 
constituencies out of a total 80 national constituencies. It remains to be seen 
whether the LCD dominated-parliament will legislate in favour of the reforms or 
not.  
 
1.4. Layout of the rest of the mini-thesis 
Chapter 2 presents a theoretical framework and research design. The first part 
provides working definitions of the key concepts of this study, namely elections 
and conflict. Furthermore, it provides an examination of the theories that form the 
basis of this study. These include liberal accounts of democracy and illegitimate 
conflict, free and fair elections, electoral institutions, and the neo-patrimonial 
state. The second part provides a detailed description of the methodology used 
in carrying out this research. This consists of a rational for purposely selecting 
respondents; what motivated the use of and the semi-structured interviews; utility 
of content analysis; and the ethical considerations that guided this research. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a full account of research findings and their analysis. It 
examines different areas and issues the respondent took to be the causes of 
election-related conflict in Lesotho. These include failure by relevant national 
institutions to adequately perform their duties, and weak economy and neo-
patrimonial tendencies in Lesotho; just to mention the main two. The chapter also 
provides answers to research questions that were aimed to establish what can 
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be done to minimise or eradicate the conflict. It discloses that the respondent felt 
that the conflicts could be minimized if the economy of the country was 
transformed and the political elites could develop the political will unity for the 
attainment of national development. 
 
Chapter 4 is concerned with a conclusion that is basically the summary of the 
main findings and the researcher‟s view of the applicability of the respondents‟ 
recommendations. It argues conflict in Lesotho is motivated by the desire of the 
political elites to ensure access to the country‟s limited resources. Most factors to 
have fanned conflict are to a greater extent linked to competition over resources.  
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CHAPTER 2:  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH 
DESIGN 
 
2.1 Definition of concepts. 
This section concerns itself with providing the working definitions of the key 
concepts of this study. This will help to provide the actual meanings of the 
concepts as used in this particular study. These concepts are elections and 
conflict. These concepts form the central part of this study. It is, therefore, 
important that the meanings of each – as used in this study – are unpacked and 
clearly understood. 
 
2.1.1. Elections 
For the purpose of this study elections refer to a process through which citizens 
vote in someone from among many candidates, to fill seats in a parliament. It is 
important to note that contrary to the mistake many people make, elections are 
far more than just voting. Elections are a multi-phased process that stretches 
over a long period. Stages of the electoral process include, among many 
registration of voters, nomination of candidates, campaigning, polling, and 
announcement of results.  
 
As a process, elections are premised on the liberal democratic theories of 
representation that appreciate a need for citizens to be represented by others in 
public decision-making. Elections have become a common feature of modern 
states because of the huge populations and vast geographical boundaries. 
These render it difficult for citizens to participate individually in public affairs, 
hence representation by an elected few. Commenting on elections, Axford and 
Rosamond state that „for the citizens, elections provide a particularly low-cost 
method of participating in the political process‟ (1997, 132). Arguing on the basis 
of rationalist strand of liberal theories of representation, Ball highlights elections 
as the best way through which citizens can select their representatives. He 
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argues that being a creature of reason, „man will use his vote in an intelligent 
fashion and is consequently entitled to a share in the selection of representatives‟ 
(1993, 122).  
 
Among others, the liberal theories of representation emphasise the importance of 
individual rights and the necessity of limiting the powers of government to protect 
those rights (Ball & Peters, 2005:163). Elections are generally regarded a 
precondition for the process of democratisation. For Bratton and Van De Walle 
(1997: 194) ‟a transition to democracy can be said to have occurred only when a 
regime has been installed on the basis of a competitive election, freely and fairly 
conducted within a matrix of civil liberties, with results accepted by all 
participants‟. According to Matlosa, elections are supposed to ensure the 
deepening and consolidation of democratic governance and political stability 
(2003: 98). It therefore follows that for a democracy to be representative, it must 
be characterized by among others „free and fair elections in which citizens‟ votes 
weigh equally, are held periodically, and that all citizens have suffrage‟ (Kapa, 
2003:70). 
 
Elections perform a number of functions within political systems. Among others, 
they provide citizens a means of choosing representatives to participate on their 
behalf where direct participation is not feasible. Furthermore, elections are a 
means of generating legitimacy to governments. Most importantly, elections 
serve as a mechanism for changing governments, or extending or renewing the 
mandate of incumbent regimes (Kapa, 2003; Helgesen, 2008). By virtue of being 
an integral feature of the liberal democracies, elections are taken to be a 
panacea for conflict and instability. However, in Lesotho, elections have over the 
years, triggered numerous conflicts, in the process undermining the very process 
of democratization.  
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 2.1.2. Conflict  
Like of other social science concepts, the meaning of conflict remains nebulous 
and elusive. The concept has been defined differently by many different authors 
to suit particular settings in which it has been used. However, all definitions 
recognise the fact that conflict involves a relationship of more than one person or 
groups, and that it involves competition. Another point of similarity between all 
authors who have defined conflict is an admission that conflict is part and parcel 
of societal life and cannot be wished away. Furthermore, all the authors are in 
agreement that conflict is not always bad, but it becomes a liability to the society 
if it reaches certain proportions where it becomes unmanageable (Mccoy, 2008 & 
Herb, 1988). Some of the definitions of conflict are examined below. 
 
According to Matlosa (1999: 165) conflict ‟denotes the incompatibility of interests, 
choices, goals and ideas over the distribution of power and scarce resources 
among many actors. Probably challenged by the above definition, Makoa argues 
that the term conflict 
 
…connotes more than incompatibility or divergence of objectives, 
opinions, personal or group values and views. It includes overt and violent 
mutual antagonism, and the threat of violence between opposed groups 
and/or parties with capacity to mobilize people for violent confrontation 
(2002: 2).  
 
A more loaded and specific definition of conflict is provided by Piper (2005). 
Following Dahl, he classifies political conflict in democracies into two; conflict as 
a clash of wills, and conflict as illegitimate politics. The former, like the one 
provided by Matlosa, views conflict in a general sense as being prevalent, and 
without necessarily being destructive in societies (see also Mccoy, 2008 & Herb, 
1988). Conflict as a clash of wills as presented in the above two definitions is the 
one on which elections as a process are based. Elections involve a competition 
which in itself is based on the divergence of values and interests. For instance 
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there is always a clash of wills when people vote for different parties. In this 
manner conflict is not problematic, hence conflict as a clash of wills is not the 
type of conflict with which this study was concerned.  
 
As illegitimate politics, conflict is defined in a more sophisticated way to imply 
„specific behaviours deemed unacceptable in a liberal democracy‟ (Piper, 2005: 
32). As a starting point to understanding conflict as illegitimate conflict, it is 
important that the concept of liberal democracy be briefly discussed. Liberal 
democracy is according to Hague et al (1992: 18), „a political system that is 
concerned with limiting the powers of government and protecting individual 
rights‟. Within liberal or representative democracies elected „officers‟ undertake to 
„represent‟ the interests or views of citizens within the framework of „rule of law‟ 
(Held 1993: 15). As a political system liberal democracy is theoretically 
underpinned on liberalism which among others stresses on individual rights and 
liberties (Ball & Peters 1993: 163). Liberal democracy has some distinctive 
political features, which include the following: „that free and fair elections in which 
citizens‟ votes weigh equally are held periodically; that all citizens have suffrage; 
and that they are free both to oppose the government and to compete for public 
office‟ (Kapa, 2004: 70). 
 
It should be noted the right to elect leaders in a free and fair election is just one 
of the numerous requirements for a system to be classified as a liberal 
democracy. Concurring with this assertion, Green & Luehrmann write that: 
 
liberal democracies are based on a deeper institutional structure that offers 
extensive protections for civil and political rights, individual and group liberties 
such as freedom of thought and expression, freedom of the press, and the right 
to form and join assemblies or organizations, including political parties and 
interest groups (2003: 304). 
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It is therefore necessary that elections be conducted within an environment 
conducive to protection and respect of individual liberties. This is the environment 
in which no liberties are infringed upon; and where there are effective specified 
mechanisms for redressing such infringements in case they occur.  
 
However, what constitutes free and fair elections has been a point of contention 
for some time. In fact, most of the time the perpetrators of election-related conflict 
have claimed their actions were motivated by the fact that elections were not free 
and fair in one way or another. For instance, the violence that erupted in Lesotho 
after the 1998 elections was sparked, among others by the opposition parties‟ 
claim that the elections were not fair. The opposition parties had participated in 
elections „under protest‟ after the court had ruled in their favour that the IEC was 
at fault for not having provided them with the voter lists in time. The court had 
however, dismissed the opposition parties‟ application that demanded the court 
to postpone the elections (Pule, 2002: 208).  
 
It was as a result of the ambiguity of the concept that several regional, 
continental and international bodies had come up with the guidelines of what is to 
qualify as free and fair elections. All these guidelines are based on the principles 
in line with liberal-democratic ideals. It is a violation of some of these guidelines 
that constitutes conflict as illegitimate politics. For instance, it constitutes a 
conflict as illegitimate politics when violence is illegally used on opponents; when 
competitors are illegally denied access to, or excluded from some of the activities 
or resources enjoyed by their rivals. Generally, all the organizations are in 
agreement on the principles of what constitutes free and fair election. This is 
observed by Matlosa (2004: 3) when he writes that „SADC election principles, in 
a large measure, resemble the African Union election principles adopted during 
the 2002 AU Summit in Durban‟. AU principles themselves are not different from 
those adopted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union in Geneva in 2006. More on the 
principles of free and fair elections is covered in the next section. 
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As a way of eliminating election-related conflict, or at least reducing it, countries 
such as Lesotho and South Africa have established Independent Electoral 
Commissions to administer their elections. The functions of these commissions 
are almost identical. For instance, the functions of the IEC in Lesotho includes „to 
ensure that every election and referendum held is free and fair, and to manage 
any conflict related to electoral issues‟ (Independent Electoral Commission of 
Lesotho Mission Statement). On the other hand, among the functions of the 
South African IEC are requirements to „promote conditions conducive to free and 
fair elections, and to adjudicate disputes which may arise from the organisation, 
administration or conducting of elections and which are not of an administrative 
nature‟ (Piper, 2005: 36). The similarities in the functions of the two commissions 
are not surprising for in the conference held in Pretoria in 2003 the African 
Association of Electoral Authorities in collaboration with the AU Commission 
agreed to „determine norms and standards that would govern the conduct and 
management of elections and electoral practices‟ (Pretoria Conference Report, 
2003).  
 
To manage conflict, the South African IEC came up with a code of conduct, 
which according to Piper (2005) provides a best example of understanding 
conflict as „illegitimate politics‟. This code of conduct is signed by parties during 
elections. In Lesotho to the contrary, there is no specific code of conduct that 
parties or candidates sign during elections. The behaviour of parties and 
candidates is guided by the general electoral code of conduct as set out in 
schedule 4 of the National Assembly Elections Order of 1992. This code of 
conduct is almost similar to the one signed by South African parties and 
candidates (this code of conduct is included in appendix A). Table 5 lists the 
principles of a liberal democratic system and reconciles them with the various 
elements of the code of conduct drawn by the South African IEC for players in 
elections. 
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Table 5: Principles of liberal democracy vs RSA IEC code of conduct 
Principles of liberal democracy 
See Green & Luehrmann (2003: 304) 
SA IEC electoral code of conduct 
See Piper (2005: 36-37). 
Protection for civil and political rights Parties and candidates are prohibited 
from: 1. Violence during an election 
2. Intimidating opponents 
3. Unreasonably preventing access to 
voters. 
4. Defacing or destroying billboards, 
placards, or any other elections 
material of other parties. 
5. Abuse of position of power to 
influence the conduct or outcome of an 
election.  
Individual and group liberties  
1. Freedom of thought and expression Commits all players to publicly state 
that everyone has the right to: 
1. Freely express their beliefs 
2. Challenge and debate the 
political beliefs and opinions of 
others 
2. Freedom of the press Commits all players to publicly state 
that everyone has the right to: 
1. Publish and distribute election 
materials 
2. Lawfully erect banners, 
billboards, placard and posters 
3. Right to form organisations  Commits all players to publicly state 
that everyone has the right to: 
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1. Recruit members 
2. Hold public meetings and to 
travel to and attend meetings. 
 
Source: own 
 
While its establishment was a celebrated move, the IEC in Lesotho has not been 
able to eradicate conflict as illegitimate politics. Failure by the commission to fully 
abide by the international bodies‟ elections guidelines continues to breed conflict 
in Lesotho politics. This is manifested as the commission fails to ensure the 
existence of level playing fields for all parties participating in elections, and to 
ensure that there is a clear separation of party from the state. For instance, the 
argument put forward by some players and observers is that the ruling party has 
the monopoly over the use of government resources, such as vehicles during 
electoral campaigns.  
 
Based on the above argument, it would be reasonable to infer that „political 
conflict, particularly elections-related, arises from the failure of the system to 
ensure constitutional liberties and to establish limits on the arbitrary exercise of 
executive power; and from any action that violates the democratic ideals as seen 
in international organizations‟ electoral guides to free and fair elections. Such 
actions include intimidation, illegitimate use of violence, and illegal exclusion of 
other parties from resources enjoyed by other competitors‟ (Green & Luehrmann, 
2003). It is important to note that such actions have a potential to fester and 
possibly graduating to political instability if not well managed. The theoretical 
framework on which this study was premised is discussed in the next section  
 
2.2. Theoretical framework 
Theories forming the basis of this study include liberal accounts of democracy 
and illegitimate conflict, free and fair elections, electoral institutions, and the neo-
patrimonial state. Generally these theories assist in unravelling the concept of 
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conflict, particularly illegitimate conflict as defined within the hegemonic liberal-
democratic model. The theories also outline the various kinds of electoral 
systems, particularly their strengths and weaknesses, together with electoral 
management bodies, as the key institutions designed to manage conflict in 
representative democracies like Lesotho. Furthermore, the theories provide the 
understanding of the developing African context of politics, which places more 
importance of political power as a source of wealth (patrimonial politics). The 
assumptions of each of the theories are applied in the study to the Lesotho‟s 
context as a way of finding answers to the research questions discussed in 
section 1.1.1. 
 
2.2.1. Liberal Democracy and Illegitimate Conflict 
Much has been said about liberal democracy in the previous section. However, it 
is important to reiterate that liberal democracy is theoretically underpinned by 
liberalism which stresses the respect and protection of individual rights and 
liberties (Ball, 1993; Hague et al, 1992). To better understand individual rights 
and liberties as contained in liberal democratic theory, it is imperative to visit 
some of the works of John Stuart Mill. Most of Mill‟s ideas on individual freedom 
and liberties form the basis of modern liberal democratic principles and are 
contained in most, if not all modern states‟ constitutions. A utilitarian that he was, 
Mill argued that happiness was the ultimate goal of each individual and ultimately 
of society at large. He, therefore, believed it was the responsibility of a 
government to take positive steps to maximise the happiness of the society 
(Baradat 1979, 94). This, he further argued can be achieved if individual 
freedoms and liberties are respected and protected by the governments. For Mill, 
liberty implied „the right to do as one wants free from the interference of others, 
so long as what one wants does no harm to others‟ (Mill 2002: 44). Mill went 
further to claim that liberty is a fundamental human right (ibid). Mill argued in 
particular for freedom of thought and discussion. Baradat writes that according to 
Mill, „freedom of speech and thought should be given absolute protection under 
the law because individual liberty was the surest way of reaching happiness‟ 
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(1997: 97). Mill was a strong advocate of minority rights and wanted 
„constitutional safeguards in democracies for the rights of minorities‟ (King and 
Kendal 2004: 46). It is clear, therefore, that Mill would call for the adoption of 
proportionally representative electoral models to ensure representation of 
minority groups.  
 
Mill was specific on what he thought to be the type of government suitable for the 
maximisation of happiness within societies. He believed a representative form of 
government was best-suited to ensure happiness - the principal objective of 
society. It thus follows that to Mill, democracy was the most appropriate of all 
types of political systems as it could best secure happiness of all and foster self-
development and individuality (Mill 2002: 44). Mill defended representative 
government as the most suitable form of political authority for ensuring 
happiness, both for society and individual because it „provides moral training and 
encourages the development of natural human sympathies. The result is the 
habit of looking at social questions from an impersonal perspective rather than 
that of self-interest‟ (ibid). 
 
In spite of his passion for democracy, Mill warned that as a political system, 
democracy had its own limitations. He warned that democracy could at times 
lead to a tyranny. He further argued that „although democracy was the preferable 
form of government, it also had a tendency to limit individual liberty‟ (Baradat 
1979; 97). It was on the basis of this argument that Mill called for the absolute 
protection of freedom of speech and thought. Mill firmly believed that for a 
democracy to achieve an intended objective – ensuring happiness, members 
must have as much education as feasible and so become better citizens. He 
believed „where the citizens are unfit and passive, democracy can be an 
instrument for tyranny‟ (Mill 2002: 46). Mill believed that when educated, citizens 
would participate more and in the process increase the chances of democracy 
achieving its objective. As stated earlier, Mill believed individuality was good. He 
was thus wary democracy had a „chief danger of suppressing individual 
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differences and of allowing no genuine development of minority opinion and of 
minority forms of culture, and imposing a single and inflexible set of mass values‟ 
(ibid). However, he remained adamant that with educated and participative 
citizens, democracy was the best form of government possible.  
 
Liberal democracy reflects a deep concern with the abuse of power by the state 
at the expense of the individual. To qualify as a liberal democracy or, in Dahl‟s 
terms, a polyarchy, a political system must be characterised by political 
participation of the citizens and respect and protection of civil rights. 
 
 In order to clearly understand what liberal democracy is, it is necessary that it is 
distinguished from electoral or illiberal democracy. An illiberal democracy is a 
system characterised by the formal establishment of a democratic electoral 
process but with major shortcomings in terms of the provision of constitutional 
liberties and the establishment of any limits on the arbitrary exercise of executive 
power. Defining illiberal democracies, Mair (2008: 115) claims they are the 
political systems in which ‟an acceptance of popular democracy and of 
government „by‟ the people is combined with the persistence or even re-
introduction of restrictions and limits on individual freedoms and rights‟. Sadly, 
Lesotho was, until at least 2005, classified as an illiberal democracy (Mair 2008: 
117). The assumption of the theory is that there is likely to be less illegitimate 
conflicts in political systems that are liberal democracies and more of such 
conflicts in illiberal democracies. The theory has therefore been useful for this 
study in assessing the relationship between the political system and the 
elections-related conflicts that are persistent in Lesotho.  
 
2.2.2. Free and fair elections. 
Political analysts such as Goodwin (2006) assume that there exists a direct 
relationship between the type of election held and conflict. Such analysts believe 
that whenever elections are not free and fair, there will be high levels of conflict 
and vice-versa. While it is generally believed, as indicated above, that free and 
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fair elections breed stability, what constitutes free and fair elections has for years 
been a point of contention among analysts. It was as a result of the ambiguity of 
the concept that several regional, continental, and international bodies have 
produced guidelines on what qualifies as free and fair election. These guidelines 
are based on principles in line with democratic ideals such as equality of 
individuals.  
 
As seen in Goodwin-Gill (2006: -viii-) the principles of free and fair elections can 
generally be grouped into three main categories. Firstly, there should be respect 
and protection of voting and elections rights. These include a right to register as 
a voter; right to vote, right to appeal if denied a chance to vote, and right to vote 
in secret. A second category involves candidature, party and campaign rights 
and responsibilities. These consist of among others, a right to participate in 
government; a right to belong to a party; to freely campaign for election; 
campaigning on equal basis of political parties, including the party forming the 
existing government (my emphasis). Lastly, the principles stipulate the state‟s 
rights and the responsibilities. These include among others the establishment of 
the independent electoral management body, regulation of political parties 
funding, and ensuring the separation of party from the state (my emphasis). 
These principles have been used in the study as a yardstick to understand 
election-related conflict as it manifests itself in Lesotho. 
 
2.2.3. Independent Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs) 
Election management bodies are central to the electoral processes everywhere. 
It is a widely held belief within the political science fraternity that the 
administration of elections by an independent election management (EMB) body 
renders such an electoral process legitimate and, therefore, minimises conflict. It 
is as a result of this belief that many countries have established independent 
bodies to run their respective elections. For instance, Lesotho and South Africa 
have established independent electoral commissions. Much has been said about 
these two particular commissions in earlier sections of the paper, and so it will 
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not be repeated. Generally EMBs have to be efficient with legitimacy to enforce 
rules and assure fairness and the cooperation of all stakeholders (Menang 2006). 
To be efficient and credible, Menang further argues, EMBs should among others 
„be independent, that is, they must not be part of the formal government 
bureaucracy; should be neutral, objective, transparent and accountable to 
parliament rather than to government; should have autonomous budgets that are 
voted directly by parliament; their members should be selected on the basis of … 
the individuals calibre, stature, public respect, competence, impartiality and their 
knowledge of elections and political development processes‟ (2006: 63). 
 
2.2.4. Electoral Models 
One of the most vital elements in the electoral process is the electoral model. 
According to Dyer (2003: 143) electoral models „act as variables in the 
distribution of political power‟. This implies that the use of „good‟ and legitimate 
electoral models may reduce or eliminate election-related conflicts. However, 
Dyer warns that electoral models are not politically neutral, as they reflect the 
diverse values and purposes of those who construct them (ibid). There are a 
number of electoral models used in different political systems. It is not easy to 
say which among such models, is the best as none has proven to be immune to 
criticism. Blais and Massicote note that analysts and practitioners have debated 
the issue of the best model for more than a century but have not been able to 
come up with a universally accepted answer (1996). For the purpose of this study 
three electoral models have been examined, namely FPTP, Proportional 
Representation (PR), and MMP. These are the models that have been part of the 
Lesotho electoral process at one stage or another. The strengths and 
weaknesses of each will be briefly sketched. 
 
FPTP relates to an electoral model used within a political system in which a 
country is divided into a number of constituencies equal to the number of seats in 
parliament. To win a contested seat, a candidate needs simply to obtain more 
votes than any other challenger. One of the most obvious strengths of the FPTP 
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is that it outperforms all other models in terms of simplicity. Apart from simplicity, 
FPTP is cheaper to run in that it does not call for extra rounds of ballots. The 
system is further credited by its supporters for producing „one party majority 
governments which are mostly stable than coalition governments‟ (Dyer, 2003). It 
also ensures accountability in that „it makes it easier for voters to get rid of the 
party they do not like from the government, replacing it with the new; the feat that 
is not very easy in coalition governments‟ (Blais and Massicote, 1996: 73). FPTP 
has however not been able to avoid criticism. The system is criticised for 
allocating seats disproportionately from the overall percentage of party votes 
(Dyer: 2003). The system is further weak in that it excludes minority parties from 
being represented in parliament (See Mahao 1997; Matlosa; 2008). 
 
The list system is the strand of the PR system that has been used in Lesotho as 
part of the MMP model since its adoption in 2002. PR relates to a system where 
the country is treated as a single large constituency and political parties draw 
lists of the candidates who will be allocated parliamentary seats in proportion to 
the percentage of the party vote. PR is praised by its proponents for ensuring 
broad and fair representation of parties in parliament. Such representation, the 
argument goes further, ensures greater diversity of viewpoints (Blais and 
Massicote, 1996: 74). Still on representation, PR is hailed for its ability to 
„reconcile the question of ethnic representation within heterogeneous societies 
where voting is along ethnic lines (ibid). This it does by ensuring that each ethnic 
group gets representation proportional to its national vote. PR is however 
accused by its critics of giving parties too much power in that they are the ones 
who draw the list of candidates. This, the accusation goes further, leads to MPs 
being less accountable to voters and more to the party. PR is also accused of 
regular formations of coalition governments which are in most cases unstable 
(experiences of Mauritius can give weight to this argument).  
 
There are two forms of mixed member systems, namely Mixed Member Parallel 
and Mixed Member Proportional. As indicated earlier, the latter is being used in 
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Lesotho. It is for this reason that proportional form of the mixed system forms the 
core of this section. MMP relates to a system composed of the mixture of both 
FPTP and PR. Formulae combinations of the two vary from one country to 
another. In this system two separate ballot papers are used, one for the election 
of the constituency-based MPs, and the other for the election of the party MPs 
(Matlosa, 2008). For instance, in the Lesotho National Assembly there are 80 
FPTP and 40 PR seats. With this system, the allocation of seats at the PR level 
is dependent on what happens on the FPTP seats and compensates for any 
disproportionality that might have occurred.  
 
The parallel form of the mixed member systems on the other hand is slightly 
different from the proportional form discussed above. While both forms use two 
separate ballot papers, the difference lies in seat allocation. With the parallel 
form, „the two sets of elections are detached and distinct and are not dependent 
on each other for seat allocations‟ (Likoti 2009: 7). It therefore follows that, unlike 
the proportional, the parallel form is not aimed at compensating for any 
disproportionality; it awards seats on the basis of votes cast and nothing more.   
 
The major advantage of the MMP is that it combines together the advantages of 
both the FPTP and the PR systems, particularly with regard to broadening 
parliamentary representation. Like all other models, MMP has not been able to 
avoid criticism. It is accused among others for affording the smaller parties a 
platform in parliament and in government through the formation coalition 
governments, which are mostly unstable ((Dyer, 2003). The next theory, the neo-
patrimonial state, is discussed in the next section. 
 
2.2.5. Neo-patrimonial state 
According to Bratton & Van de Walle (quoted in deGrassi, 2008: 1) 
‟neopatrimonialism is commonly understood as a hybrid regime consisting of, on 
the one hand, an exterior modern, formal, rational-legal state like apparatus (the 
“neo”) and on the other hand, a patrimonial spoils network in which centralized 
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elites mobilize political support by using their public position to distribute jobs, 
rent-seeking opportunities, and resources as personal favours‟. Describing 
African states as being neo-patrimonial, Van de Walle (2001: 52) posits that in 
these states, „patrimonial practices coexist with modern bureaucracy; 
officeholders almost systematically appropriate public resources for their own use 
and political authority is largely based on clientelist practices, including 
patronage, various forms of rent-seeking, and prebendalism‟. Kabemba argues 
that Lesotho, like her other African counterparts is trapped in the problem of 
patrimonialism (2003). The capture of state power in these countries is translated 
into economic power through accumulation; the state becomes inextricably 
entangled, resulting in a rent-seeking state with rent-seeking elite connecting 
themselves to the state, turning the state monopoly to their personal benefit and 
to that of their families, friends, and clients (Matlosa, 1997).  
 
Under these circumstances winning elections becomes more than just capturing 
state power. The stakes become high and losers at the elections hardly come to 
terms with the loss. This is because the loss of elections does not imply only the 
loss of parliamentary seats, it also implies loss of employment opportunity, and 
all related financial gains. The losers resort to desperate measures that in most 
cases lead to eruption or intensification in conflict. The importance attached to 
winning elections is evident in Lesotho. Because of a weak economy and a lack 
of a viable private sector, the state in Lesotho has become the second largest 
employer after the volatile and poorly paying textile industry (Kapa, 2006). The 
implication of this is that patronage is used by those who hold state power to 
provide the scarce employment opportunities to those who are in one way or 
another aligned to the political elite of the ruling party. On the other hand 
centrality of the state in economy implies that government tenders are usually 
given to the traders and firms that have links to the ruling party. This state of 
affairs renders elections in Lesotho a zero-sum game, hence all the struggles 
over elections. While it is true that competition for the spoils of office occurs even 
in liberal-democratic systems, it is in illiberal democracies such as Lesotho where 
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neo-patrimonial tendencies are most common. This emanates from weak 
institutions which cannot adequately deal with corrupt officials. 
2.3 Research design 
This section provides an outline of the methods used to conduct this study. The 
section is divided into a number of subsections that include research 
methodology; types of data, both primary and secondary; data processing, 
presentation, and analysis; and ethical considerations that guided the research. 
 
 2.3.1 Research Methodology 
With this study, my main concern was to have an in-depth understanding of 
election-related conflict as it unfolds in Lesotho. This study has as a result been 
entirely qualitative in nature.  According to Babbie and Mouton, in qualitative 
studies researchers are always primarily interested in describing the actions of 
the research participants in great detail, and to understand the social 
phenomenon in terms of the actors‟ own beliefs, history, and context (2001, 271). 
By virtue of being qualitative, the study has adopted qualitative methods of data 
collection. Qualitative data was chosen because of its utility for descriptive types 
of study such as this one. Showing the utility of qualitative data, Miles and 
Huberman state that qualitative data are ‟a source of well grounded rich 
descriptions and explanations of processes in identifiable local contexts; with 
qualitative data, one can see precisely which events let to which consequences 
and derive fruitful explanations; qualitative data are likely to lead to serendipitous 
findings and to new integrations, they help researchers go beyond initial 
conceptions and to generate and revise conceptual frameworks; findings of 
qualitative data have a quality of “undeniability”, words …have a concrete, vivid, 
meaningful flavour that often proves more convincing to a reader – another 
researcher – a policymaker – a practitioner – than pages and summarised 
numbers‟ (1994: 1).  
 
Data collected through the use of intense semi-structured interviews was 
preferred. This was to allow the researcher to probe for more information on 
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important points raised by the interviewees as interviews progressed. According 
to Lee (2007) the strengths of qualitative methods such as semi-structured 
interviews lie in the fact that they meet intended aims, as well as provide indirect 
effects. Among the intended aims, these methods ‟encourage more open 
discussions and capture feedback in context; have indirect effects in that they 
provide feedback mechanism for grievances as well as an opportunity to raise 
queries‟ (ibid). A detailed explanation of the methods used for data collection is 
discussed in the next section. Furthermore, interview schedule and questionnaire 
are included as appendix D and E respectively. 
 
2.3.2 Qualitative Data 
Qualitative data was gathered by seeking the opinions of the people who have 
directly been involved in the elections-related conflicts in Lesotho, either as 
belligerent factions or as mediators. The respondents were as a result purposely 
selected. A total of 16 respondents were initially targeted. However, because of 
logistical constraints, such as unavailability of some respondents and a limited 
time the researcher had in Lesotho, only 11 respondents were interviewed. 
Eleven, however, sufficient as all the respondents were people of high calibre 
who understood the conflict very well. These consisted of five senior political 
party officials (each drawn from one of the five main political parties that were 
once involved in the conflicts namely the All Basotho Convention (ABC), Basotho 
National Party (BNP), Basutoland Congress Party (BCP), Lesotho Congress for 
Democracy (LCD), and Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP)); one member of the 
Lesotho Council of Non-governmental Organizations (LCN) who has in the past 
mediated in the conflicts; one church leader representing the heads of churches 
who have in the past mediated under the auspices of the Christian Council of 
Lesotho (CCL); a current senior official of the IEC; a former commissioner of the 
IEC; and two academics. All the interviews were held in Maseru during the first 
two weeks of July 2009. 
 
2.3.3 Secondary data and documentation 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
Secondary data in this study include such documents as the National Assembly 
Election Order, 1992, IEC publications; Government Gazettes; judgements of the 
past court cases on election-related conflicts; academic journals; newspaper 
articles; political parties and government publications. 
 
 2.3.4 Data processing, analysis, and presentation 
Once the data had been collected, content analysis was employed to analyse it. 
The data had been collected through written notes as well as recording of the 
interviews. The written notes were carefully studied and the tapes replayed to 
identify the factors identified by each respondent as a way of coding data. Coding 
refers to the process in which raw data is organised into conceptual categories to 
create themes or concepts which are used to analyse the data (Neuman; 2000). 
The coded data was then thoroughly studied and inferences made. According to 
Neuman to infer means to pass judgment, to use reasoning, and to reach 
conclusion based on evidence. It is therefore important to emphasize that all the 
conclusions made in the study were made based on the evidence given by the 
respondents. The findings and judgments were then compiled and presented as 
will be seen in chapter 3. 
 
 2.3.5 Research Ethics 
This study was conducted within the field of Social Sciences. As a result it had to 
abide by the ethical rules and regulations of the discipline and maintain 
professional integrity. Many social science associations that include amongst 
others the British Sociological Association, the Association of Social 
Anthropologists of the Commonwealth, and the Social Research Association 
abide by standard ethical codes of social research. Generally, these codes 
require researchers to ‟have a responsibility both to safeguard the proper 
interests of those involved in or affected by their work, and to report their findings 
accurately and truthfully‟ (Caputi and Balnaves, 2001: 239).  
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The consideration of this ethical code guided the entire process of interviews with 
the respondents. The respondents were people who have in the past been 
involved in election-related conflict in one way or another. Some might have had 
traumatising experiences during the conflicts. As a way of abiding by ethical 
considerations during the research process, I committed not to proceed with the 
interviews without the consent of the participants; not to act an in any way that 
would lead to the respondents feeling shame or embarrassment. As a way of 
ensuring the autonomy of the respondents, I committed to protect their identity 
unless they indicated otherwise. Most of the respondents, however, stressed 
there was no need to hide their identity and gave permission to have their names 
shown in the study. Their names are therefore listed under appendix C. I also 
fully informed the respondents about the nature of the research and the role they 
were expected to play. Furthermore, I promised the findings of the study would 
be relayed to the respondents. All these commitments are captured in a consent 
form that respondents were expected to read and sign before interviews were 
conducted. The form is included in appendix B. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 
The reception I got from the interviewees was in most cases astonishing. All the 
respondents expressed willingness to share their knowledge and experiences 
about the election-related conflicts in Lesotho with me. In most cases interviews 
extended far more than the hour initially intended as a maximum. Most 
interviewees emphasised the content, and not the length of interview, was 
important. As a result they sacrificed time for the interviews.  
 
As can be expected in any research involving opinions, there were differing, 
sometimes completely contradictory views on certain issues while the views were 
similar in others. Generally all respondents concurred that election-related 
conflict in Lesotho is an on-going phenomenon inherent in each and every stage 
of the electoral process. All respondents admitted, however, that it is mainly after 
the announcement of election results that the conflict graduates to greater 
proportions, sometimes violent. The respondents however, differed in opinion in 
regard to why the conflict persists until it takes a new form after the 
announcement of‟ results. An analysis of the interviewees‟ responses revealed a 
number of factors that were identified by the respondents as the causes or 
intensifiers of the elections-related conflict. These include among others the 
discriminatory usage of public resources for elections purposes by the ruling 
party; failure to concede defeat by losing parties; rigging of elections; the 
questionable management of the elections by the IEC; biased courts; the 
country‟s weak economy; election observers. Elaborate opinions of the 
respondents regarding each of the areas are discussed in the next section. 
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3.1 Discriminatory use of state resources during elections 
 
One of the main principles of free and fair elections is the ensuring of a level 
playing field. This implies all parties, including the party forming the existing 
government, have to campaign on an equal basis (Goodwin-Gill, 2006: -viii-). 
Mbagua posits failure to ensure playing fields are level and the subsequent 
selective use of state resources by the incumbent parties form one of the most 
common causes of the electoral conflicts (2006: 27). The discriminatory use of 
state resources by the ruling party was one of the areas on which the 
respondents differed. All agreed the ruling party enjoys preferential use of state 
resources, such as vehicles and media channels, during electoral processes. 
What the respondents differed on was the legitimacy of such exclusionary 
practices. One respondent argued the use of the national resources by the ruling 
party is often exaggerated by the opposition. This interviewee went on to show 
that this is inevitable in that members of the ruling party campaign for elections 
while still occupying public offices. These are mostly members of the cabinet, 
who in spite of parliament being dissolved, remain in charge of ministries until a 
post-election cabinet is formed. By virtue of being in office, the respondent went 
further; „such officials are entitled to the 24 hours use of these resources‟. Based 
on this argument the respondent felt the use of state resources by the ruling 
party should not be seen as an issue of conflict. The respondent strongly advised 
those who complained about this issue to rather „focus their efforts on how to 
mobilise resources for financing their own campaigns instead of complaining of 
things that cannot be changed‟. 
 
A host of other respondents were of the opinion that the exclusionary use of state 
resources by the ruling party renders elections unfair in that the party campaigns 
from an advantageous position. Asked to comment on the fact that members of 
the ruling party have to use the state resources as they campaign while they still 
occupy public office, one respondent replied that the argument holds, but only to 
a limited extent. This respondent argued that the reasoning holds only to as far 
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as ministers‟ official cars are concerned. „The same cannot be said about 
government vans and buses that transport supporters to the ruling party‟s 
campaigns‟. In order to highlight how the ruling party benefits from competing 
from the advantaged position, one respondent noted that the ruling party has all 
of its rallies aired on both Radio and TV Lesotho. This is never the case with the 
opposition parties. The opposition has to rely on few Maseru-based private radio 
stations. This does not in anyway redress the problem as these radio stations 
hardly cover Maseru itself. To the contrary, Radio Lesotho covers almost 100 % 
of the country. It is important to note that the respondent claimed even these 
Maseru-based radio stations providing campaigning platform to the opposition do 
so at their own peril as they often find themselves in the government “bad 
books”. Such media houses are sometimes denied advertisement business by 
government ministries and departments because of their sympathy with 
opposition parties. An example made in support of this allegation was of the 
Public Eye newspaper. According to the informant, a few years back the 
government ordered all its departments to stop advertising with the newspaper 
on the grounds the newspaper was anti-government. This sanctioning of the 
paper was reported by the respondent to have been endorsed by the then LCD 
secretary Mpho Malie who is alleged to have boasted the sanctions would teach 
the newspaper in future to treat the government as a business partner. With the 
private sector being weak in Lesotho, doing business with government is the only 
sustainable survival strategy for any firm. In most cases this leaves the media 
houses in a position where they have to make a choice between reporting the 
opposition parties‟ business and perish, or ignoring them in order to survive 
financially. 
 
The respondents revealed that while the members of the incumbent government 
and the ruling party enjoy unlimited mileage in state vehicles and media during 
elections, opposition parties have to rely private funds to finance their 
campaigns.  The argument is that while it is not illegal for parties to have private 
sponsorship, it is not easy for the parties, especially those outside the 
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government, to secure such sponsorships because of the country‟s weak private 
sector. The only assured money parties receive for campaigning is the paltry 
subvention of M450 (equivalent of South Africa‟s R450) the IEC provides per 
each registered candidate. One respondent observed that apart from the money 
being of little value, it is rendered even less useful by the fact that the IEC usually 
releases it to the parties only a few days before the polling day. One party leader 
recalled how due to the delays caused by the IEC, he could manage to pass the 
money from IEC to his party‟s candidates in the rural constituencies only after the 
polling day.  
 
As said earlier, the theory of free and fair elections assumes that conflict is high 
when elections are not free and fair. For the elections to be free and fair, parties, 
ruling and opposition, have to campaign on an equal basis, and there has to be a 
clear separation of the ruling party from the state (Goodwin-Gill 2006: -viii-). All 
respondents agreed the two principles hardly exist during elections in Lesotho, 
hence the unending conflict. With the ruling party campaigning from an 
advantageous position as it is the practice now, it is likely that conflict will always 
persist. The relationship between failure to accept defeat by the losing parties 
and conflict is discussed in the next section.  
 
3.2 Failure by the losing parties to accept defeat 
As stated earlier, all general elections held in Lesotho since 1965 had their 
results disputed. Not surprising therefore, failure to accept election results by the 
losing parties has been identified as one of the areas on which conflict is centred. 
The argument here is that conflict takes new levels when losers fail to recognise 
the winners. Respondents had two different views with regard to failure to accept 
elections‟ results. The first view regards the refusal of elections‟ results as 
“unfortunate actions of elements against democracy”. The second view takes this 
refusal as justified and the only right way to take under the circumstances the 
losers find themselves in. 
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For the first view, losers refuse to accept election results as they cannot cope 
with the emotional pain of losing. One respondent who supported this view 
claimed the members of the opposition parties in Lesotho lack „sporting 
behaviour. They fail to admit that failure is part and parcel of life‟. According to 
this respondent, „the opposition parties become too ambitious and spent fortunes 
on the campaigns with the hope of making up for the losses if they win elections 
and form the government‟. Asked if the losing parties ever show unhappiness 
during the earlier stages of the electoral process, the respondent stated that the 
parties normally do not want to use the existing mechanisms to address the 
“small issues” that surface in the early stage of the electoral process. The 
respondent went further to argue that the parties later resort to these “small 
issues” and use them as excuses for not accepting defeats. 
 
While they generally shared the position of the first view that losing is by nature 
emotionally painful, the proponents of the second view believed there is more to 
failure to accept defeat than just the natural pain. The proponents of this view 
maintained that the failure to accept election results is motivated among others 
by rigging of elections, failure of the conflict resolution mechanisms to resolve 
conflicts adequately, as well as the use of vulgar language by the victors to 
humiliate losers. Refuting the suggestion that the losers always refuse to 
concede defeat, one respondent stated that whenever they found it legitimate, 
the opposition parties have always been quick to concede defeat. This 
respondent made an example of a case in 1993 when the MFP congratulated the 
BCP for its victory. This was according to the respondent, meant to „do away with 
the overstated assumption of the pain of defeat, as well as to set a precedence of 
tolerance for a viable democracy‟.  
 
On many occasions parties that have disputed election results, they have 
claimed that the elections were rigged. For instance, as described earlier in the 
paper, both the BCP and the MFP claimed elections were rigged in favour of the 
BNP in 1965. In 1993 the „equation‟ was reversed and the BNP claimed the 
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elections were rigged in favour of the BCP. It, therefore, did not appear as a big 
surprise when one interviewee mentioned that the opposition parties refuse to 
accept defeat because such defeats resulted from the rigging. This respondent 
claimed that usually, the total numbers of constituency votes given by the IEC do 
not correspond with the aggregate numbers recorded at the polling stations. As 
an example of how numbers can be manipulated, the respondent mentioned an 
alleged case at the Seqonoka constituency in the 2002 elections. According to 
the respondent, although the LPC was the eventual winner at the constituency, 
the final total of votes provided by the IEC was far less than the aggregate of the 
votes the party received at the constituency‟s polling stations. „This discrepancy 
was not seriously investigated as the party affected - the LPC, won the 
constituency despite the discrepancy‟, continued the respondent. An attempt to 
investigate this alleged discrepancy did not yield results as all other interviewees 
interviewed after this particular respondent did not seem to know of the incident.   
 
Respondents also refuted a claim that losers do not use existing mechanism to 
address dissatisfactions that emerge during the early stages of the electoral 
process. The respondents argued that parties do use the existing mechanisms 
but are always given a raw deal in that judgments from these mechanisms 
always favour the ruling party, regardless of evidence the opposition parties 
might produce. A few examples of cases where opposition parties approached 
authorities to redress their grievances but failed were provided. For instance, 
respondents noted that in 1998 the conflict was already manifested even before 
the polling day. This became visible when the opposition parties namely the 
BNP, BCP and MFP contested elections „under protest‟. The parties were 
aggrieved by a High Court ruling just days before polling day. The parties had 
taken the IEC to court over the commission‟s failure to provide them with 
provisional electoral lists for the 80 Lesotho constituencies. In the same 
application, the three parties had asked the court to postpone elections to give 
them enough time to study the lists. While the High Court ruled that the IEC was 
at fault for not providing the parties with the lists, it said it had no powers to 
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postpone elections as that was the prerogative of the king. Thus the elections 
went ahead in spite of an obvious conflict. How this conflict intensified and 
graduated to violent proportions has been dealt with in detail in the previous 
sections of this work and as such deserves no repetition. 
 
The second example of a pre-polling day grievance that parties took to the 
concerned authorities, but were allegedly given a raw deal relates to the 2007 
general election, also discussed in detail earlier. One respondent stated that he 
took it upon himself to alert the relevant authorities of the subversion of the MMP 
model and the dangers the subversion was going to bring to the country. The 
respondent argued he approached not only the IEC, but also SADC and the 
Commonwealth. Lesotho is a member of both organisations and the two have 
been actively involved in the country‟s political conflict in the past. It is a well 
documented fact that in spite of a warning sent to these bodies, particularly the 
IEC, nothing was done to deal with the matter and the model was eventually 
distorted, leaving the country with the persistent conflict that characterises 
Lesotho‟s politics today. 
 
Furthermore, failure to accept election results by losers was attributed by the 
respondents to a role played by the use of abusive and inciting language in 
Lesotho politics, particularly by the political leadership. The respondents noted 
that the use of abusive language in contemporary times plays a significant role in 
the conflicts. The argument is that the abusive language exacerbates the 
naturally painful experience of defeat. While former leaders such as the late 
Chief Leabua Jonathan took their share of blame for use of abusive language, 
the leader of the ruling party, Pakalitha Mosisili was pointed as the main culprit in 
contemporary politics. Some respondents claimed Mosisili statements were 
responsible for inciting opposition parties to refuse to accept defeat in 
contemporary times. One respondent, who looked literally shaken, pointed out 
how he was „saddened by the Prime Minister‟s use of language, his arrogance, 
and his failure to bring the losers on board‟.  
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Few examples of these incidences of use of provocative language were given by 
respondents. The most memorable statement the Prime Minister is accused of is 
one he is alleged to have made when he answered a question posed to him as to 
why the opposing ABC had been able to attract youth, something other parties, 
including his own have failed to do in the past. In response, the Prime Minister is 
on record saying in Sesotho that, “Masepa a macha a ratoa ke lit‟sint‟si; haholo 
ha a le masehla‟. (Literally translated, the statement means that, „freshly 
defecated faeces always attract flies, especially when such faeces is yellow in 
colour‟).  The points to be noted here are that the “freshly defecated faeces” here 
refers to the newly formed ABC. It is also important to note that yellow is the 
official colour of the ABC hence the mention of the “yellow faeces”. Furthermore, 
the “flies” refer to the youth that have joined the ABC in numbers. The 
respondents reported to be disturbed that a leader of Mosisili‟s calibre would 
compare his opponents to faeces. One respondent accused the Prime Minister of 
once „arrogantly boasting‟ to the opposition that, “Moriana o nooa o baba” (the 
medicine is taken even when it is bitter in taste). By this he was implying that he 
would continue to rule the opposition despite their claims that his party continued 
winning the elections unfairly. While the both statements may sound „„harmless‟‟ 
when translated into English, they are very undermining in Sesotho, especially 
under the circumstances in which they were said.  
 
Prime Minister Mosisili was further accused by one respondent of „playing a 
greater role in turning what was otherwise a peaceful sit-in by the opposition 
supporters at the palace gates in 1998 into a violent chaos that it came to be‟. 
This respondent maintained it was only after Mosisili had made his now famous 
„ba ntekane‟ (I will match them (opposition protesters) “physically”) statement in 
parliament that the demonstrators resorted to violent behaviour. Mosisili had in 
parliament castigated what he termed an unruly militant behaviour by 
demonstrators. He went on to proclaim he was ready to match their militant 
actions pound for pound. The respondent recalled „it was subsequent to the 
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proclamation that the demonstrators invaded the parliament grounds and Mosisili 
had to be sneaked into the palace through an opening made by his bodyguards 
in the palace fence‟. However, according the respondents, the prime minister 
„remains unrepentant and continues to use the inciting language in most of his 
speeches‟. 
 
The continued reckless use of language as demonstrated above, particularly 
during the electoral process, wideness the animosity gap existing between ruling 
and opposition parties. This unacceptable type of behaviour, some the 
respondents noted, results from a lack of a legally binding code of conduct for 
political parties. It will be recalled at this juncture that this paper has already 
shown that, unlike in South Africa, parties in Lesotho do not sign any legally 
binding code of conduct. The behaviour of political parties and politicians is 
guided by an Electoral Code of Conduct as provided in the National Assembly 
Elections Order No. 10 of 1992. This code is silent on a number of issues, hence 
can hardly be binding. For instance, it does not stipulate any penalty for violation 
of the code, nor does it show who is eligible to file complaints pertaining to any 
violations.  This „„loophole‟‟ in the electoral law allows situations in which some 
politicians „play man and not the ball‟, one respondent observed. The 
seriousness of the lack of legally binding code of conduct became visible when, 
at a rally held in Maputsoe in May 2009, the supporters of the ruling LCD burnt 
the merchandise belonging to the opposing ABC. This rally was covered by TV 
Lesotho and was aired on the national TV few days later where the irresponsible 
and inciting actions were seen by viewers.  
 
One of the principles of the free and fair elections is the protection of civil and 
political rights. These include among others, freedom from violence and abusive 
language (Green & Luehrmann 2003: 304). The reported use of abusive and 
intimidating language by the Lesotho political leadership violates that principle. 
Lack of a legally binding code of conduct also does not help efforts in trying to 
eradicate illegitimate conflict from the Lesotho elections. Clearly specified laws of 
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a code of conduct, with clearly stipulated sentences are required as a way of 
deterring unacceptable acts such as those specified above. Laws are required as 
the situation in Lesotho is differs from those in advanced democracies where 
„norms and standards for elections have become integral part of the democratic 
practice and do not need to be codified‟ (Memang 2006: 61). The findings 
discussed in this section affirm there is a causal relationship between elections 
not free and unfair, and conflict. The next section focuses on the role of the IEC 
in election-related conflicts.  
  
3.3 The role of the IEC in fanning the conflict 
Contrary to the spirit in which it was established, the IEC has been identified by 
some interviewees as the most serious of the roots of elections-related conflict in 
Lesotho. According to its mission mtatement, the IEC aims „to ensure that every 
election and referendum held is free and fair, and to manage any conflict related 
to electoral issues‟ (1997). The general feeling among respondents was, 
however, the IEC actions are the direct opposite of its mission statement. 
Explaining how the IEC fans the conflict, one respondent gave an example of the 
latest dispute related to the allocation of seats in parliament.  According to the 
respondent, the IEC has alienated the stakeholders from the problem by 
subjecting it entirely to the legal experts. The respondent stressed that the IEC 
„has treated the model as a legal arrangement subject to the interpretation only 
by the legal experts and not the stakeholders (political parties). During violations 
of the model, the IEC hides behind the argument that it cannot intervene, but the 
courts of law can‟.  The respondent was basing his argument on the interview 
The Public Eye newspaper had with the IEC‟s legal officer Moteka Mohale 
earlier. Part of the interview reads: 
 
Public Eye (PE): Do you ordinarily share the conversation with the IEC 
chairman Leshele Thoahlane? 
Moteka Mohale (MM): Yes, quite frequently. 
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PE: Do you agree with his publicly expressed view that the main parties 
adulterated the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) electoral model by 
contesting the February 2007 general election in the manner they did? 
MM: Yes, I do. I am aware of the pronouncement and agree with it. 
PE: And you still think nothing was wrong in the running of the elections? 
MM: Not in terms of the law. 
PE: What do you mean? 
MM: Exactly what he said. That the model was adulterated, but you see it was 
not violated, and there is a tremendous difference between the two. 
PE: Does the law allow what happened in the elections, the contestation of 
elections only on one ballot by any party which so wishes? 
MM: It is silent; both the National Assembly Elections Act and the national 
Constitution are silent on that. (Public Eye; Friday April 11, 2008) 
 
That the IEC became aware of the possible adulteration of the model well in 
advance, and went on to “midwife” such an adulteration under the claim that the 
law is silent on the issue was reported by the respondent as a sign of how the 
IEC subjected political issues to law unnecessarily, in the process fanning the 
conflict.  
 
Explaining the relationship between the IEC and political parties, one respondent 
said it is based on „mistrust as a result of self-deception‟. According to the 
respondent, the situation is such „there exists among the two sides inability to 
appreciate one‟s weaknesses; there is too much of superiority complex; things 
are correct (in the eyes of each side) only to the extent that they are in favour of 
that particular side‟. Some respondents were of the opinion that the commission 
is there to serve and protect the interests of the ruling party. On the other hand, 
some indicated the IEC is doing its job correctly and is only „used as a scapegoat 
by those who want to pursue their own undemocratic agendas‟. The respondents 
who came to the defence of the IEC argued that it is “childish” to say the IEC is 
biased because, according to one respondent, „in all stages of the electoral 
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process the IEC works hand-in-hand with the political parties‟. One respondent 
added: „the stakeholders (in elections) are incredible; they work hand-in-hand 
with the IEC only to portray a different picture when they come to the media‟. 
One example in which the IEC works hand in hand with the political parties given 
by one respondent was the recent electoral law review. The respondent pointed 
out that in concert with all registered political parties, the IEC, through the Law 
Review Committee, had just completed a comprehensive revamp of the election 
law, with a view of plugging loopholes that have led to the latest disputes.  
 
For those respondents who saw the IEC as a cause of conflict, the commission 
remains trapped with the same problems its predecessor, the Electoral Office. 
The Electoral Office had been accused by opposition parties of failing to 
adequately perform its functions adequately; advancing the interests of the 
government at the expense of the opposition parties (Moeletsi oa Basotho 
January, 10 1993). The respondents argued the ruling party does as it pleases to 
promote its interests through the IEC. For instance, one respondent argued that 
the IEC does not treat the leader of the ruling LCD as all other competitors. The 
LCD leader is reported to be accorded preferential treatment by the commission 
and whatever he „suggests‟ is usually adopted by the commission. The 
respondents argue that it is difficult to separate the LCD from the IEC. As a way 
of strengthening the argument about the difficulty of separating the ruling party 
from the IEC, one respondent provided cases in which he felt the role of the LCD 
in cases involving the IEC was questionable. Firstly he observed that in the MFP 
case, the LCD, and not the IEC, raised the technical legal points that led to the 
dismissal of the case. The case was dismissed on the technical grounds that the 
MFP lacked locus standi. Secondly, the respondent argued that „the SADC 
mediation (headed by Sir Ketumile Masire) came to Lesotho to review the work 
of the IEC (and not of the LCD), yet it was the ruling party - not the IEC, that 
impeded the review‟. One respondent emphasised that the above „is not strange 
because the ruling party is the sole beneficiary of the IEC‟s „„corrupt‟‟ practices‟.  
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Some respondents went even further to question the inclusion of the term 
“independent” in the naming of the commission. One respondent suggested the 
word “independent” be replaced by “national”; another suggested that the 
commission be named a “referee”. The change of name, the respondents 
believed could go a long way to helping the commission better understand its 
role. 
 
An alleged lack of independence by the IEC was also attributed by respondents 
to the staffing policy of the commission. All respondents (even those who came 
to its defence) are in agreed when it comes to staffing, the commission is 
independent only to the level of commissioners. The recruitment procedure for 
commissioners is such that political parties jointly short-list and recommend 
prospective candidates for appointment by the king (Makoa, 2002). This, 
however, does not imply that the King has full appointive powers. According to 
the constitution, the king appoints commissioners on the advice of the state 
council. Other than commissioners, the rest of the IEC staff are civil servants who 
sign employment contracts with the Public Service Commission (PSC). However, 
much as they are independently recruited, the „independence‟ of the 
commissioners themselves remained a highly contested issue to the 
interviewees. Defending the independence of the commissioners, one 
respondent pointed out people who question the independence of commissioners 
are unreliable politicians. The respondent continued to show that during the 
recruitment process „the political parties have their own preferred candidates. 
Surprisingly, when these preferred candidates come to office and act according 
to the rules and the regulations of the commission, the very same parties that 
favoured them begin to accuse them of being biased towards the ruling party‟.   
 
Showing a lack of confidence in the entire process of commissioners‟ 
recruitment, one respondent claimed, „much as the process for the recruitment of 
commissioners looks transparent, in the final analysis the commissioners are 
selected by the ruling party because it wields more power in the State Council‟. 
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As an example, one respondent raised concerns about the recruitment of the 
latest commissioner Faku Likoti. According to the respondent, Likoti was 
appointed to the position because of the “passion” he had developed for the 
ruling party shortly before his appointment. The respondent argued that Likoti 
was frequently seen on national television, and heard on national radio 
legitimising everything made by the ruling party. Still on Likoti‟s case, another 
respondent claimed he acquired his position as a reward for his defence of the 
ruling party, particularly the presentation he is alleged to have made on Public 
Service day in 2008, just before his appointment. In this talk, Likoti is alleged to 
have lambasted civil servants, to the joy of the ruling party, alleging they were 
agents of opposition party‟s intent on sabotaging the LCD government. It remains 
unclear if it is by coincidence or not, but presently Likoti, together with the IEC 
chairman Limakatso Mokhothu, are now reported to be dismissing the call for re-
distribution of seats in the parliament following Masire‟s report. The position held 
by the two is in line with the stance of the ruling party in regard to the matter. The 
third commissioner Malefetsane Nkhahle is on the other hand understood to be 
in support of the redistribution – the move the opposition parties have been 
calling for (Public Eye online. August 7, 2009).  
 
Several arguments were made by various respondents in support of a claim that 
IEC commissioners do not act independently. One respondent boldly argued the 
biased tendencies of the IEC, in favour of the ruling LCD, „are not a result is 
ignorance, but of vested interests‟. Airing what they perceived to be a testimony 
that the IEC commissioners promote the interests of the ruling party, some 
respondents pointed out the emerging trend in which the commissioners „retire‟ 
into top civil service jobs. This, the respondents viewed as a sort of a “golden 
handshake for the work well done”. Such commissioners include Sekara Mafisa, 
Leshele Thoahlane (both former chairmen), and Mokhele Likate. Upon 
retirement, the trio have taken jobs as the Ombudsman, Director of Anti-
Corruption Unit, and the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Lesotho to Japan 
respectively. Another example related to the controversial extension of 
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Thoahlane‟s contract prior to 2007 general election. One respondent observed t 
the government had earlier surprised everyone when it decided not to follow the 
usual procedure for recruiting commissioners, but to arbitrarily extend 
Thoahlane‟s contract. The prime minister had indicated that government 
extended Thoahlane‟s contract as they needed his experience gathered in 
running elections in the past, to run the 2007 elections. 
 
 Furthermore, an absence of commissioner independence according to the 
respondents emanates from the fact that the commissioners have in the past 
become beneficiaries of the controversial government enrichment schemes. For 
instance, one respondent pointed out the commissioners benefited from a 
scheme in which government ministers acquired Mercedes Benz C Class sedans 
for M4 000 (Four thousand Maloti/Rand) while lower officers who hold statutory 
positions (including the commissioners) took home Toyota Camry 2.4 XLI sedans 
for M2 500 (two thousand and five hundred Maloti/Rand). The cars have come to 
be popularly known as likhapha tsa Basotho (Basotho‟s tears) in the country. 
 
The general feeling among the respondents was that this problem of “lack of 
independence” of the commission staff can be minimised if the commissioners 
can be recruited through autonomous recruitment bodies. One respondent 
recommended such bodies consist of retired academics and other senior 
statesmen. With regard to junior staff the recommendation was that they be 
recruited and paid directly by the commission, without any involvement of the 
Public Service Commission.   
 
The analysis of these responses disclosed that most stakeholders in the 
elections had very little, or no confidence at all on the commission. This implies 
that the commission cannot be able to enforce rules and assure fairness and the 
cooperation of all stakeholders. Under such circumstances it is inevitable that 
conflicts will persist. The perception of the respondents, that the IEC is not 
independent did not come as a complete surprise to the au. During my brief stay 
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in the employment of the commission as a District Electoral Officer for Mohale‟s 
Hoek district between 2003 and 2004, I, together with my colleagues, had raised 
the issue – that people hardly regard the IEC as independent, with the 
commission senior administration. As a District Electoral Officer, I regularly 
visited the villages to conduct the commission‟s business such as voter 
registration. Like it is a procedure in Lesotho, the chiefs were responsible for 
facilitating my meetings with the people in their respective areas. It was during 
these interactions that the chiefs and the villagers would always refer to me and 
my colleagues as bahlanka ba „muso (government servants). Attempts to 
convince these villagers that we came from an „independent‟ commission usually 
fell on death ears. This confusion, we observed, resulted from among others, the 
fact the commission used, and still uses, vehicles with red registration numbers, 
the colour reserved for government vehicles. In Lesotho privately owned cars 
bear blue registration numbers. The commission needs to conduct a serious 
introspection if it hopes to win the confidence of stakeholders and ensure conflict-
free elections. The following section discusses the views of the respondents 
about the role of the courts of law in election-related conflicts. 
 
3.4 The courts of law 
There were mixed views among respondents in regard to the role of the country‟s 
courts in election-related conflict. On one hand some respondents argued the 
courts should not be blamed in any way for the conflict. On the other hand others 
felt the courts play a significant role in fanning the conflict. The general feeling 
among respondents who believed the courts were blameless was that people 
blame the courts because they do not understand how the courts operate. This 
concern was raised by one respondent according to whom, „people, due to their 
lack of understanding of the operations of courts, expect the courts to overstep 
their jurisdictions‟. The respondent made an example of the people who 
complained when the High Court declared that it did not have jurisdiction over the 
MFP case that concerned the allocation of PR parliamentary seats by the IEC. 
This respondent emphasised if the court had ruled on the matter – as some 
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opposition parties wanted, it would have overstepped its jurisdiction and that 
would have been illegal.  
 
Concurring with the assertion that some people fail to understand how courts 
operate, another respondent, a lawyer, reminded the researcher that judges on 
the bench are legally allowed to „apply their minds‟ and consider the implications 
of their judgments in order to avert crises. The respondent insisted this practice is 
universal and not unique to Lesotho‟s courts. The respondent gave an example 
of the court cases involving President Jacob Zuma of South Africa shortly before 
he became president of the Republic. According to the respondent, the judgment 
given by Judge Nicholson was more influenced by Zuma‟s position as the 
president of the African National Congress (ANC), and the president-in waiting 
(of the country) than by merits and substance. The respondent added that the 
provision that judges apply their minds and consider implications of their 
judgments constituted the predicament on which the courts find themselves when 
dealing with political cases.  
 
In this way, the respondent made it clear it is not always appropriate that political 
cases are heard by the normal courts. Unlike criminal cases for instance, political 
cases cannot be treated as „winner-takes-all‟ situations. In its own nature, politics 
involves compromises, a situation that courts rarely offer. The respondent 
furthermore, made an example by referring to the case lodged by the MFP over 
the allocation of seats in parliament after the 2007 general elections. As 
mentioned earlier in this paper, this case was dismissed on technicalities, not on 
merits and substance. This respondent argued „in spite of the court not ruling on 
the matter, it was clear to all, including the defendant – the IEC that the manner 
in which it allocated the seats was wrong. The respondent went further to argue 
that if the judge had not „applied‟ his mind the IEC could have lost the case and 
the implications would have been very serious for the country. The respondent 
further argued that „the judge had to act as he did because acting otherwise 
would have constituted a crisis that would have probably led to the dissolution of 
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the cabinet as some of the ministers would have been affected by the judgment 
and forced to leave the parliament, and subsequently the cabinet‟.  
 
Limitations of the Lesotho Courts in resolving political disputes have also been 
observed by Sir Ketumile Masire. Commenting on how in his view the judgment 
passed by the High Court has failed to provide a solution to a political case, Sir 
Ketumile said: „Although the government of Lesotho does not agree, I am of the 
firm view that the High Court decided not to decide the petition before them by 
Marematlou Freedom Party in which some of the issues giving rise to the dispute 
were raised. As a result, the judgement of the Court was unhelpful‟ (my italics) 
(Intelserv Lesotho. July, 15 2009). 
 
The respondents who felt the courts can be held accountable for the conflict were 
in agreement the autonomy of the judiciary from the executive is blur, that is, if it 
ever existed. The respondents were concerned judges were part of the 
beneficiaries of the government‟s likhapha tsa Basotho scheme discussed earlier 
in the paper. It is worth noting that the acquiring of the cars by the judges was 
condemned, even by the Lesotho Law Society. Giving an opinion on the courts, 
one respondent argued the courts are „weak and completely lack the capacity to 
decide on the cases of the magnitude of the political cases brought before them‟. 
Stating his opinion on the right of judges to „apply‟ their minds and consider the 
implications of their judgments, the respondent felt „it was wrong for judges to 
deliver „biased‟ judgments in the name of „considering implications‟. The 
respondent felt the courts have to interpret the law as it is and be less concerned 
about „implications‟. The respondent made an example of a case brought before 
a South African High Court judge involving the right to go on strike by workers 
employed on construction of the 2010 World Cup stadiums. The respondent 
observed a strike by the workers would have serious implications not only for 
South Africa, but for the entire world as the 2010 soccer World Cup tournament 
is a global event. The respondent indicated how he was impressed by the judge 
who heard the case as he was undeterred by „implications‟ from delivering 
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justice. The judge ruled in favour of the workers and said in his judgment that 
they had a constitutional right to strike. The respondent felt this example should 
be copied in Lesotho‟s courts. 
 
Airing his view on the role of the courts in the conflict, one respondent described 
them as „mischievous in presiding over election-related disputes‟. On the same 
note, another respondent claimed the courts consist of „frightened judges who 
cannot stand on their own‟. As a result, the respondent continued, „it is almost 
impossible to win a „serious‟ case against the government, or any case that the 
government has interests in‟. Two cases were mentioned by respondents as to 
support their argument.  The first example relates to Anthony Manyeli‟s case in 
which the Appeal Court was convened during the process of hearing the case in 
the High Court. The leader of the NIP, Anthony Manyeli had made an application 
to the High Court to declare the electoral pact his deputy Motikoe had signed with 
the LCD (allegedly behind Manyeli‟s back) null and void. Aware that its ally was 
likely to lose the case, the ruling LCD used its influence to convene the Appeal 
Court while the case was still being heard in the lower court. In delivering the 
ruling, Acting Judge Mrs ‟Maseforo Mahase commented: „…Regrettably this court 
knows, and this is a matter of common cause that the respondents have already 
pre-empted the ruling herein as they have already filed an application to the court 
of Appeal long before this matter has been disposed off and this ruling delivered‟ 
(Lesotho High Court CIV/APN/45/07).  
 
The judge subsequently ruled in favour of Manyeli only for her judgment to be 
overturned by the Appeal Court. Another strange thing about the case was the 
controversial involvement of Justice Nthomeng Majara in the case. Commenting 
on the role of the judge, Advocate Molefi Ntlhoki stated: „Among others, I was 
shocked to find Justice Nthomeng Matete recusing herself from that case, citing 
the friendship of her father, Majara Matete, with Manyeli – and then suddenly 
surfacing as the judge in the appeal of the same case, refusing to recuse herself‟ 
(Public Eye September 04 2009). While it is not clear if Justice Majara had any 
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direct influence in the overturning of the High Court ruling by the Court of Appeal, 
it is worth noting her lack of consistency raised doubts to the people involved in 
this high stakes case.    
 
A second example relates to the now infamous case lodged by the MFP about 
the allocation of seats. The respondents felt during the case, the court, in concert 
with the ruling LCD deliberately played delaying tactics aimed at benefiting the 
latter. Summarising the episode of the case, Kapa notes that: 
 
Initially, the MFP lodged a court case challenging the allocation of PR seats, but 
was persuaded to withdraw this to allow negotiations mediated by SADC‟s 
mediator, the retired President of Botswana Sir Ketumile Masire. The ruling LCD 
was adamant that it could not get into any talks while the matter was before the 
High Court. When the MFP attempted to withdraw the case as requested, the 
LCD somersaulted and became resolute that it wanted the case to continue. It 
was clear that the solution would be a matter of either politics or law (2009: 9)  
 
It is now history that the MFP lost the case on technicalities - that the party did 
not have locus standi and that the court did not have jurisdiction over the case.  
 
Interestingly, the judgment given by the court on that case has become a new 
centre around which conflict looms. On the one hand the ruling party insists it 
cannot discuss the matter as that would be tantamount to undermining the courts 
of law. The LCD‟s position is that the court has made a ruling that the allocation 
of seats was legitimate. On another hand the opposition parties are seeking other 
out-of-court avenues for resolving the issue of the allocation of seats, maintaining 
the court had never really pronounced itself on the matter. The whole confusion 
was brought about by the fact that before declaring that the court did not have 
jurisdiction over the case, the judge had made certain comments during his 
ruling. Firstly, he maintained „alliance-formation tends to „distort‟ or „subvert‟ the 
principle of „compensation‟ under the PR system” but this “does not render 
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alliance-formation illegal per se” and that aspect “ought to be corrected by law‟. 
Because the phenomenon of alliance-formation is not forbidden in law, the Court 
“cannot declare as illegal something not prohibited under the law‟ (The High 
Court of Lesotho Judgement, 2008 read in Kapa, 2009: 11). Secondly, the judge 
stated that “the IEC was not enjoined to treat – for the purposes of PR allocation 
– any alliance as a single entity unless such alliance contested constituency 
seats as a single entity” (ibid).  
 
The convening of the Court of Appeal and the delaying tactics as seen in the first 
and second cases were reported by one respondent to be “examples of how the 
ruling party can frustrate the opposition by contingently resorting to mechanisms 
favouring its position, even if such mechanisms are illegal”. In emphasising how 
the LCD „abuses‟ its privilege of being having a majority in parliament, one 
informant referred to a proposed amendment of the constitution made by the 
party in March 2008. If passed, the amendment would have allowed election-
related cases to be appealed.  Nyaka writes that „the Sixth amendment, which 
had been given thumbs up in the Lower House, was seeking a leeway to appeal 
against an election petition by MFP‟ (Public Eye, April 8 2009). At this point the 
MFP case was pending in the High Court. The amendment, however, could not 
be passed as the majority of the senators, made up of 22 principal chiefs and 11 
nominees at the king‟s discretion, voted against it. The rejection of the bill led to a 
heated debate between ruling party MPs and senators. The senators made it 
clear „they were not against the amendment of the bill but were against the timing 
as it was proposed pending the MFP case in court‟ (ibid).  
 
The debate over the role of the courts in political conflicts continues to deepen as 
stunning revelations are made in regard to some judges. One respondent 
mentioned that „at one birthday-party ceremony, the judge who presided on the 
MFP case confessed that if he had (judge) ruled according to the evidence, and 
not according to the technicalities, “Basotho would be telling a different story” 
(meaning the parliament would have been dissolved)”. The same judge made 
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headlines late in 2009, with newspapers reporting that he regretted his verdict. 
The judge is reported to have confessed to the lawyer who represented the MFP 
in the case, Advocate Molefi Ntlhoki about his feelings. Selinyane reports that 
Ntlhoki told the Lesotho Law Society meeting that „the said judge in the case later 
asked him (Ntlhoki) if he could still count him among his friends, and then blurted, 
‟Man, do you know I made that judgement against my conscience?‟. Another 
stunning revelation made by Ntlhoki was that „the verdict of the court (in the MFP 
case) came out of a casual remark by Chief Justice Mahapela Lehohla before he 
selected the members of the bench who would hear the case‟. Ntlhoki reports 
that „when the parties went to see the chief justice to discuss whether costs 
would be awarded at the end of the case, Lehohla said that the first thing to 
consider was whether a party had locus standi to bring an election petition to 
court‟. It is now history the court ruled on the technicality that the MFP did not 
have the locus standi to bring the petition to court (ibid). 
 
What makes Ntlhoki‟s revelations about the chief justice more interesting is the 
observation Chief Justice Lehohla is a brother to the Deputy Prime Minister and 
Deputy leader of the LCD, Lesao Lehohla who had signed the contested NIP-
LCD alliance. Ntlhoki further disclosed that he objected to Lehohla appointing the 
bench by virtue of he (Lehohla) being a brother to the man who had signed the 
disputed alliance and on the grounds he was already insinuating the MFP did not 
have locus standi. His objection was however, dismissed (ibid). Revelations such 
as these can only help to diminish the already limited trust the parties outside 
government are having in the Lesotho‟s.  
 
Responses from these two sections have affirmed the listing of Lesotho as an 
illiberal democracy (Mair 2008: 117). As read earlier, this relates to a political 
system in which „an acceptance of popular democracy and of government „by‟ 
the people is combined with the persistence or even re-introduction of restrictions 
and limits on individual freedoms and rights‟ (Mair 2008: 115). To the contrary, 
liberal democracies are based on a deeper institutional structure offering 
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extensive protections for civil and political rights, individual and group liberties 
such as freedom of thought and expression, freedom of the Press, and a right to 
form and join assemblies or organizations, including political parties and interest 
groups (Green & Luehrmann 2003). In liberal democracies there exist functional 
mechanisms which effectively redress the infringements of individual liberties. 
The responses indicated this in not the case in Lesotho. Both the courts of law 
and the IEC have been reported respondents as having been unable to redress 
the infringements concerning opposition parties adequately, hence escalating 
conflict. Much as the IEC satisfies most requirements of the efficient and credible 
EMBs listed by Menang (2006), its independence remains questionable as it was 
not easy for the respondents to argue that the IEC was not part of the formal 
government bureaucracy. The responses furthermore, indicated the country‟s 
failure to establish relevant courts to arbitrate electoral disputes was a blow to 
the country‟s efforts to resolve election-related conflict. It is worth noting that as 
part of SADC, Lesotho has committed itself to establishing such a court at a 
meeting of SADC heads of states and governments held in Mauritius in 2004 
(Menang 2006: 62).  The next section examines the link between the conflicts 
and the electoral models.  
  
3.5 Electoral models 
Electoral models used by the country since its first general election in 1965 were 
identified as having a role, albeit minor, in the emergence of election-related 
conflict by some respondents. For instance, one informant argued that the failure 
of the FPTP model to accommodate the opposition parties in parliament was the 
reason why the political elite resorted to violent behaviour before the model was 
abandoned in 2002. However, the respondents‟ general view was that the 
problem lies not with the electoral models, but with the mistrust in political 
leadership, and their lack of political will to resolve differences amicably. The 
respondents, however, conceded each model has its own strengths and 
limitations. Most respondents felt the adoption of the MMP in 2002 was a positive 
step in that the model is more inclusive than its predecessor, the FPTP. After the 
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adoption of the MMP, a majority of the parties obtained representation in 
parliament, a feat never enjoyed before. Respondents emphasised that as long 
as there is no political will by either the victors to accommodate the losers, or by 
the losers to accept defeat, every model would face manipulation in one way or 
another. 
 
Explaining how for instance, the MMP failed to effect the desired stability in spite 
of being a result of negotiations between numerous parties, one respondent 
emphasised the parties were „not only interested in being included in the 
parliament but were more interested in number of seats they have‟. The 
respondent went on to argue „now that they are included in the parliament, the 
opposition parties want to have more and more seats‟. While the one respondent 
blamed opposition parties for the collapse of the MMP, another was quick to 
place the blame on what he called the „cunning‟ character of the ruling LCD. The 
respondent indicated that the parties in the IPA had, as a part of the compromise, 
agreed that the model would be used at the formula of 80 FPTP seats: 40 PR 
seats for 2002 elections, and then 80: 50 for subsequent elections. The 
respondent went further to show that „when the bill was passed in parliament to 
enact an act that would allow the arrangement, the LCD somersaulted and 
prevented the bill from being made a law‟. The bill had to be voted on and the 
LCD „used its majority to vote against the amendment‟.  
 
As seen earlier in this paper, adoption of the MMP model brought some relative 
stability after 2002 elections. It therefore came as a surprise to many people 
when the two big parties, the LCD and ABC formed alliances with smaller 
partners to subvert the model. However, to some observers this was not 
unexpected. Explaining how the model was subverted, one respondent stressed 
the inclusion of smaller parties in parliament was never seen as progress by the 
ruling party. The respondent argued presence of an opposition posed a threat to 
the ruling party dominance because of its well documented internal fights that 
usually lead to splits‟. It should be remembered that the ruling party – LCD, itself 
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broke away from the then ruling BCP in 1997 and relegated the BCP into an 
opposition. In 2001 the LCD split when 27 MPs severed ties with the party to 
form the LPC. The threat posed to the ruling party by the significant opposition in 
parliament became evident when the party split and the ABC was formed in 
2006. This placed the ruling party in a precarious position that eventually led to 
its leader urging the King to call for a snap election. As discussed earlier, the 
formation of the ABC left the ruling party with the majority of only two seats. 
According to this respondent, the LCD went into this alliance to amass sufficient 
seats to guard against future crises in case the party experienced some more of 
what have become its traditional splits. The respondent went further to show it 
was not surprising to see the ABC follow the ruling party‟s example. This was, 
explained the respondent, „ because Thabane (ABC‟s leader) had always been 
the mastermind behind the LCD‟s Machiavellian tendencies; he was part of the 
initial phases of the LCD plan to go into this alliance, he knew its dangers very 
well, therefore, he had to counter his former party‟s acts‟. One respondent 
warned that as much as attention about political parties‟ manipulative practices 
was concentrated on the LCD/NIP and ABC/LWP alliances, it was worth noting 
that even smaller PFD was a culprit in the subversion of the model. This 
respondent argued the PFD was awarded a PR seat in spite of having not 
contested FPTP seats. This, according to the respondent was wrong as PR seats 
were supposed to be compensatory seats, for disproportionalities in the FPTP. 
 
The distortion of the models for certain-party interests has been explained by 
respondents as a result of a lack of political will, particularly from the ruling party, 
to work closely with other parties. On many occasions mediators from within and 
without the country have brought the disagreeing ruling and opposition parties 
together. At all mediations memoranda of agreement were signed. The sad 
reality, however, is that the mediations have never brought a lasting solution for 
sooner or later some parties reneged from the agreements. Showing how the 
ruling party lacked the political will, one respondent referenced to deliberations at 
one of the LCD leadership conferences prior to the February 2007 elections. This 
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was the conference at which the party resolved to form the now infamous 
alliance with the NIP. According to the respondent, the formation of the alliance 
was described by the ruling party leadership as: „A strategy of reclaiming our 
seats (lost through PR to smaller parties in 2002)‟. The next section focuses on 
the role of election observers in fanning the conflicts. 
 
3.6 Election observers 
The research also demonstrated some sectors of the society place part of the 
blame for election-related conflict on election observers. It is however worth 
noting that unlike with other factors, respondents were almost evenly divided 
about the role of observers in the conflict. Those who felt the observers do not 
have a role in the conflict basically argued that „the presence observers gives the 
elections credibility and minimises the probability of the conflicts by bringing 
objectivity while minimising subjectivity‟, in the running of elections. Commenting 
on the accusation that the observers usually arrive only on the eve of polling, one 
respondent urged politicians to be „realistic‟. He suggested that it would not be 
possible to have the observers throughout the entire electoral process for cost 
reasons. The respondent continued that local politicians should „take 
responsibility and prevent any wrongdoings in the electoral process and not just 
hope the presence of the observers would be a panacea for such ills‟. 
 
Other respondents were of the view observers normally make general 
pronouncements on elections although they never observe all phases of the 
electoral process. One respondent argued it was unfair for observers to at any 
time to pronounce the elections „free and fair‟. According to this respondent, 
observers only qualify to talk of the „freeness‟, that they observe on the polling 
day, and not fairness as that is manifested in the earlier stages, long before they 
show up. With anger written all over his face, one respondent referred to election 
observers as „holiday-makers‟. The respondent mentioned how disappointed he 
was that in 2007 observers, particularly from the SADC and the Commonwealth, 
failed to ask about „the rumour that the model was going to be subverted‟. The 
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two organisations had allegedly been warned beforehand about a planned 
subversion of the model through LCD/NIP and ABC/LWP alliances.  
 
Furthermore election observers were accused of „returning reports pointing to 
violations of electoral standards, at the same time endorsing the winners. One 
respondent argued such pronouncements lead to conflict in that they strengthen 
the conflicting positions of both winners and losers. With the elections being 
endorsed the winners‟ disregard the stated violations, while the losers see the 
violations as proof enough to declare elections not free and fair. The next section 
examines how the country‟s weak economy is associated with conflict. 
 
3.7 Weak economy and neo-patrimonial practices 
Just as with other factors, respondents were divided on the role Lesotho‟s weak 
economy plays in the eruption and intensification of the election-related conflict. 
However, the majority of respondents agreed a weak economy is a contributory 
factor in the conflict. Arguing that weak economy was not necessarily a cause of 
conflict, one respondent said it would be wrong to generalise on the theory as 
according to him, a prominent politician himself, he was not in politics for money, 
but to impart knowledge to the younger generation. This argument was 
supported by another respondent who said, „much as the theory may hold for the 
political party‟s destitute grassroots membership, it would be improper to make a 
general conclusion with regard to the matter‟. The respondent noted that those 
who have spoilt national politics were the elites who had lots of economic 
opportunities‟. The respondent made an example of the Prime Minister Mosisili 
and Advocate Kelebone Maope. Both politicians are former university lecturers 
and have at one time or another been involved in decisions that fanned conflict.  
 
Generally other respondents agreed Lesotho‟s politics represent what Chabal 
and Daloz (1999) have called the „politics of the belly‟. One respondent argued 
conflicts will persist for as long as the economy remains untransformed. One 
respondent compared elections in Lesotho to the road to economic survival. In 
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this case capturing the state (through winning elections) equals capturing 
economic resources‟. In support of the argument equating capturing of state 
power to economic accumulation, one respondent jokingly challenged me to 
adjourn the interview for 30 minutes and drive into town to make a survey of the 
most luxurious cars on the city roads. According to the respondent, the most 
luxurious vehicles on Lesotho bear the registration letter H. The letter H is the 
registration letter for Qacha‟s Neck, the home district of the prime minister. With 
this, the respondent implied that capturing of state power by Mosisili has 
translated to economic gain for people close to him. The respondent went further 
to argue that government tenders have of late come to be awarded to the few 
selected local companies. The respondent gave an example of a certain 
construction company involved in a number of major projects involving millions of 
Maloti. The projects mentioned included the renovation of the national stadium 
and construction of urban roads just to mention the two. The respondent went 
further to say that „the company belonged to one of the closest relatives of the 
prime minister and it continues to be awarded tenders despite an unimpressive 
record of low quality work”.  
 
Having shown how the capture of state power has translated into economic gain 
for those close to the prime minister, this informant was, however, quick to state 
it was not a new phenomenon in Lesotho. He gave an example of what he called 
a common joke during the BNP rule. He said, it was then joked that if one 
boarded a plane at the then Jan Smuts Airport (Johannesburg) carrying a 
Lesotho passport, attendants would normally address him as “Mr Molapo”. 
Molapo is the family name for the then Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan. The 
explanation was that with Jonathan in power, all the travel opportunities were 
reserved for his family members and cronies.  
 
The equation of state power to economic accumulation was seen by one 
respondent as perpetuating poverty for losers and ensuring wealth for winners of 
the elections. The informant observed that „ Poverty to the losers is perpetuated 
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among others by the fact that politics is a stigmatising practice and people who 
engage in politics hardly get employment opportunities in the almost non-existent 
private sector of Lesotho‟. As they have no other option of making ends meet, 
opposition politicians try every trick in the book to capture state power while the 
ruling ones do likewise to retain it. Another respondent emphasised that because 
of limited economic opportunities, even people in stable jobs such as university 
lecturers, quit to join politics as „the trend has shown that it is mostly in 
government where people make money easily‟. Supporting the argument, the 
respondent used two cases in which politicians have looted national resources. 
The first involved a scheme in which government ministers “bought” Mercedes 
Benz C Class sedans for M4 000 while the permanent secretaries and heads of 
statutory bodies acquired Toyota Camry sedans for M2 500. These were some of 
the many vehicles they had used as their official cars for the previous three 
years. A second example related to the loan scheme in which MPs, ruling and 
opposition alike, took interest-free loans amounting to M400 000 from the public 
purse. 
  
A closer analysis of the situation in Lesotho, based on the findings above, affirms 
that Lesotho remains trapped in the problem of neopatrimonialism – a system 
consisting of an exterior modern, formal, rational-legal state like apparatus (the 
“neo”) and on the other hand, a patrimonial spoils network in which centralized 
elites mobilize political support by using their public position to distribute jobs, 
rent-seeking opportunities, and resources as personal favours” Bratton & Van de 
Walle (quoted in deGrassi, 2008: 1). It is for this reason that conflict persists as 
rent-seeking behaviours and mobilization of political support through the use of 
state resources violate the citizens‟ fundamental rights. This situation affirms 
Sekatle‟s argument that, „because of a weak economic base the state in Lesotho 
is not able to accumulate enough resources to redistribute among the citizenry in 
the form of employment, welfare benefits etc. This results in a situation where the 
majority of the people live in poverty and squalor while few clamour for the 
control of political parties and government so as to be in the position to influence 
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the division of the spoils‟ (1997: 84). A closer understanding of formation of 
election alliances prior to 2007 elections showed it to be motivated to a greater 
extent by economic gains. The alliances were formed to ensure politicians won 
parliamentary seats and gained economic benefits attached to being a MP. It 
was also as a result of these neo-patrimonial tendencies that parties have been 
splitting from time to time. For instance, the formation of the ABC resulted from 
similar concerns - of loss economic gains. Most of the MPs who formed the ABC 
were faced with uncertain parliamentary futures following the amendment of the 
LCD constitution which gave powers to the NEC to approve constituencies‟ 
nominees. Among others, the LCD leadership had emphasized that the 
nominees should be university graduates. Most of the LCD MPs do not have 
tertiary education. It was for this reason the MPs felt threatened by the 
amendment to the party constitution. Apart from MPs, their cronies in the form of 
constituency secretaries would be financially affected by loss of the 
parliamentary seats by the MPs. All FPTP MPs have constituency allowances 
and are allowed to arbitrarily employ their own secretaries who man the 
constituency offices. This privilege has reportedly been abused as the MPs have 
on several occasions been accused of employing only people who are members 
of the ruling party or cronies.   
 
With the factors regarded as responsible for the eruption and intensification of 
election-related conflict identified, the next part of the interview concerns itself 
with the possible remedies to the conflicts.  
 
3.8 What needs to be done to minimise the conflict. 
To end interviews each informant was asked to provide a personal opinion on 
what the country needs to do solve the problem of election-related conflict. As 
seen in the last section, much blame for the emergence of the conflict was 
placed on the IEC‟s failure to execute its duties independently of the ruling party. 
It thus followed, according to most respondents, the first step to ensuring 
eradication, or at least minimising conflict would be to transform the IEC. 
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Respondents, however, conceded that transforming the commission would not 
be an easy task. This, according to respondents, posed a dilemma as the very 
beneficiary of the biased operations of the commission, the ruling party, would 
have to be a pioneer of the proposed transformation. The proposed 
transformation is according to one respondent, „almost impossible as the current 
situation is „not accidental, but a well orchestrated arrangement by the ruling 
party to promote its own interests‟. 
 
A number of specific points was pointed by respondent. Although secondary and 
mostly dependent on the attaining independence by the IEC, these were factors 
which could on their own, minimise conflicts drastically. These include the 
intensification of civic education, adoption of a legally binding electoral code of 
conduct, transformation of the economy, engagement of mediators to promote 
dialogue, and strengthening the Basotho culture of community. One respondent 
warned that the country needs to work towards ensuring tolerance. The 
respondent however, admitted that this would be a costly exercise both in terms 
of time and finances, therefore, it would require much patience. 
 
Some informants felt that if civic education is intensified and the citizens know 
their rights, the conflict would de-escalate. Supporting this view, one interviewee 
suggested conflict „escalates because the politicians take advantage of the 
ignorance of the citizens and use them (sic) to pursue their self-centred 
agendas‟. The respondents therefore called for civil society organisations such 
as churches to play a part in releasing the country from the shackles of conflict 
by explaining to members their rights. Another step respondents felt would be 
positive in minimising conflict was the adoption of a legally binding code of 
conduct for all stake holders at elections. The respondents felt the presence of 
such conduct would deter stakeholders from acting in an inciting manner that 
usually leads to confrontations. The respondent, however, observed the success 
of such a code of conduct would depend entirely on the presence of autonomous 
and unbiased courts of law. 
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Another way to minimise conflict according respondents, was to transform the 
country‟s weak economy. As one respondent warned, the transformation of the 
economy would require great willingness and patience. One respondent argued 
that important as it might appear, the transformation of the economy was unlikely 
to be achieved soon as it remains the prerogative of the ruling party. Ironically, 
the respondent observed, the ruling party to some extent contributes to keeping 
the economy weak. The respondent went further to argue that “through its 
policies, the ruling party keeps the economy weak to generate poverty as it 
(poverty) helps keep the masses submissive”. However, the respondent admitted 
that if by chance, the economy could be transformed, conflict would be minimised 
as political power would cease to be the only sustainable means of making 
money. Politicians would no longer see elections as a matter of life and death as 
there would be alternatives to ensure economic survival.  
 
To ensure tranquillity, the country was advised by some of the respondents 
persist in seeking a solution through dialogue. One respondent advised that the 
country continues engaging external mediators, thinking they are more likely to 
be objective than local counterparts. Laughing slightly, the respondent observed 
some problems to which external mediators have been exposed in the past. The 
respondent emphasised, “we really need external mediators, although we tend to 
resort to sovereignty and call them foreigners when their mediation does not go 
in our favour”. The respondent however, warned that to be successful, such 
mediators needed to appreciate the uniqueness of Lesotho‟s situation and not 
propose a one-size-fits-all approach. 
 
From the responses discussed above, it is clear the election-related conflict in 
Lesotho is deeply rooted and will therefore be difficult to minimise, let alone 
eradicate. This poses a dilemma because as the respondents claim, some 
people benefit from the very existence of the factors that constitute conflict. The 
situation is even more complex because the alleged beneficiaries of the conflict 
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are those who have power to make reforms necessary to minimise the conflict. 
As argued earlier in the paper, most, if not all factors perpetuating election-
related conflict are just means to an end – attaining political power as a way of 
ensuring economic survival for stakeholders.  It thus remains the eradication of 
conflicts will depend to a greater extent on the development of political will by 
those who hold power. Under existing circumstances, that does not seem likely, 
at least in the near future. It is, therefore, based on the analysis of the interviews, 
not an exaggeration to suggest elections-related conflict is likely to form part of 
the electoral process in Lesotho for years to come. The next chapter provides a 
conclusion to this research project.  
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS 
 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a brief summary of the study. It begins by providing the 
summary of the evolution of election-related conflicts in Lesotho. It then proceeds 
to examine initiatives the country‟s leadership have taken as an attempt to arrest 
the conflict. It further provides the objective of the study and re-examines its 
methodology. Furthermore, the chapter re-visits the meaning of conflict, and 
lastly and more importantly it summarises the research findings before it 
highlights some of the recommendations made by the respondents on how to 
deal with the problem of elections-related conflicts 
 
4.2. The evolution of elections-related conflict 
The Kingdom of Lesotho has never seen a conflict-free general election in its 
entire history. All general elections, right from pre-independence in 1965 to the 
most recent in 2007 have been disputed, some times violently. The 1970 and 
1998 elections were the most violently disputed, with the latter marking the apex 
of Lesotho‟s political conflict. In 1965 the BCP and the MFP refused to 
acknowledge a BNP victory, claiming the elections were rigged in favour of the 
latter (Pule 2002: 173). In 1970 the election results were not announced as the 
then ruling BNP, through its leader Chief Leabua Jonathan, annulled the poll and 
suspended the constitution when it became obvious his party was losing to the 
BCP. The BNP engaged in one-party rule until 1993 when Chief Leabua‟s 
government was overthrown by the army in a bloodless coup (Mahao, 1997). The 
country returned to democracy when a democratic general election was held in 
1993, the election was won overwhelmingly by the BCP. While the MFP 
congratulated the BCP on its historic win, the BNP refused to accept the results 
claiming the election was rigged in favour of the BCP. The skirmishes that 
followed the BNP‟s refusal to accept defeat resulted in the King dissolving the 
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BCP government in August 1994. The BCP government was restored through 
the intervention of the SADC states and this was to mark the beginning of a 
seemingly unending involvement of foreign countries in Lesotho‟s political 
conflict, particularly election-related.  In 1998 the elections‟ disputes turned 
violent when opposition parties namely the BCP, BNP and MFP, refused to 
accept the newly formed LCD‟s victory also claiming that the elections were 
rigged in favour of the latter. The subsequent clashes culminated into 
unprecedented violence, diffused only after military intervention by South Africa 
and later Botswana. The next election was organised in 2002. The outcome was 
relatively accepted with only the BNP pointing out some alleged irregularities in 
the electoral process (Southall, 2003: 290). However, in spite of alleged 
irregularities, the BNP took its seats in parliament alongside other opposition 
parties, but indicated it was not going to participate in by-elections that might 
arise, as a way of protest. The opposition parties had won representation in 
parliament through the PR wing of the MMP electoral model adopted by the 
country prior to the elections; 2007 then saw the country hold a snap general 
election after the split of the ruling LCD and the resultant formation of the ABC. 
The election became historic in that for the first time in the country‟s electoral 
history, the ruling party lost all constituencies in the capital and few urban others 
to a newcomer, the ABC. The election was characterised by formation of 
electoral alliances aimed at ensuring aligning parties enjoyed larger 
representation in parliament. The legality of these alliances and the allocation of 
the parliamentary seats that resulted as a direct existence of these alliances 
became the centre of post-election disputes that remain unresolved even today, 
more than two years after the election. 
 
4.3. Initiatives aimed at arresting elections-related conflict 
A number of initiatives were taken by the Lesotho political elite as an attempt to 
reduce election-related conflict. These included most importantly, the replacing of 
the Electoral Office by the Independent Electoral Commission in 1997; the 
discarding of the FPTP the adoption of MMP in 2002; the enlargement of the 
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National Assembly from 80 to 120 seats in 2002; engagement of local and 
foreign mediators during conflicts. However, all efforts have failed to yield 
positive results as the conflict remains.  
 
4.4. The objective of the study and research methodology 
The main objective of this study was to seek a thorough understanding of 
election-related conflict as it manifests itself in Lesotho. The study attempted to 
answer such questions as: What political conflict is; how electoral institutions 
have related to conflict in the past; what the country needs to do to reduce 
elections-related conflicts. As part of the primary data, intense interviews were 
held with knowledgeable purposely selected respondents who understand the 
country‟s election-related conflict. All interviews were conducted in Maseru in 
July 2009. Secondary data was collected through a continuous intensive review 
of various documented literature. A number of events related to the conflict have 
taken place since July when the interviews were held. For instance, the SADC 
pioneered mediation has collapsed and the political parties have recently agreed 
to a local mediation under Bishop Phillip Mokuku. Some of these events are 
covered in this work. 
 
4.5. The meaning of conflict 
Various definitions of conflict, as provided by different authors, were discussed in 
the study. The definitions have much in common and all define conflict in terms 
of relations between two parties or more. Furthermore, most of the definitions 
define conflict along the assumptions of liberal democratic theory. It was on this 
basis that for the purpose of this study, Piper‟s definition of conflict was adopted 
and conflict defined as illegitimate politics (2005). In this manner conflict is 
defined in a general way to imply „specific behaviours deemed unacceptable in a 
liberal democracy‟ (ibid). The study showed electoral institutions, from the 
Electoral Office abolished in 1997, right to the today‟s IEC, have all been at the 
centre of election-related conflict in Lesotho. For instance, throughout history, 
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opposition parties never seemed to have confidence in either institution. Both 
institutions have at different times been accused by opposition of being biased in 
favour of the incumbent party. In spite of numerous attempts to involve the 
opposition parties in their affairs, neither institution managed to do enough to win 
their confidence. Relations remain acrimonious between the IEC and the 
opposition parties and the future appears bleak. 
 
4.6. Summary of research findings 
Data gathered through interviews and documented literature has disclosed t 
election-related conflict in Lesotho manifests within a generally polluted political 
and economic environment. This implies that what turns out to be election-related 
conflict is in most cases rooted in other spheres not necessarily related to 
elections. For instance, most conflict has its roots in the political polarity that 
characterises Lesotho politics. A close investigation of the conflict reveals that on 
numerous occasions the conflicts have spared the national and congress 
extremes of the country‟s political polarity against each other. The animosity 
between the two extremes has been in existence from as early as 1959 when the 
BNP was formed as a breakaway from the BCP; long before the first general 
election was held in 1965. The polarity was then based mostly on policy issues 
such as the working relations with the then apartheid government of South Africa, 
the parties‟ positions on the monarchy and chieftainship, and relations with 
specific rival churches. The BNP maintained that based on its position, Lesotho 
had no option but to work closely with the apartheid government in South Africa 
without necessarily condoning the practices. This position came to shift later 
when the BNP government began to work closely with South African liberation 
movements and gave their members political asylum (Pule, 2002). The party 
further supported the monarchy and chieftainship, and enjoined close 
relationship with the Catholic Church (ibid). The BCP, on the other hand was 
against any relationship with the then South African government, was anti-
monarchy and chieftainship, and enjoyed close relations with the Lesotho 
Evangelist Church.  This polarity remains part of Lesotho politics even today, 
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although now less intense. This has in many cases fuelled tensions at elections 
with either side finding it painful to accept defeat by its rival. 
 
Weak and unsustainable economic environment in Lesotho has been shown by 
the study as another factor that intensifying election-related conflict. All other 
factors are in one way or another related to it. Under prevailing economic 
conditions in the country, being part of the government, or at least being 
associated with the ruling elite becomes a step to economic survival. It, therefore, 
follows elections become a matter of life and death and as a result losing 
becomes a non-option for political leadership. This results in political parties 
refusing to accept defeat and in most cases resorting to complaining about 
somehow irrelevant issues with too little or nothing at all to do with election 
results. A weak economy has further polluted the political environment in that it 
has led to numerous party splits. Close examination of all splits to have occurred 
does not reveal any ideological differences, rather personal clashes mostly 
premised around the positions of leadership, attached benefits, and control of 
party resources and those of government for the party winning elections. The 
split factions have in many cases come to spare against one another at the end 
of electoral processes. 
 
Two major examples lending support to a claim that splits within Lesotho are 
mainly a result of a scramble for resources are discussed below. Some splits 
have not been that significant as the parties were out of government and as a 
result had few resources over which to fight.  Pule (1999) notes that the BCP‟s 
split that led to the establishment of the LCD was mainly a result of the factions‟ 
desire to control the party‟s National Executive Committee (NEC). The BCP‟s 
NEC has constitutional powers to determine the final list of candidates who stand 
for elections under the party‟s umbrella (ibid). It, therefore, followed being in the 
party‟s leadership obviously translated to having influence on who was to be 
nominated for elections and enjoy the subsequent financial awards that go with 
being an MP.  
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In a similar manner, the LCD‟s split that gave birth to the ABC has its roots in 
members‟ fear of financial loss. One ABC high ranking official Clement 
Machakela, is quoted by Public Eye Newspaper (November 15, 2006) stating a 
major cause of their breakaway from the LCD was „the amendment to the LCD 
constitution which granted the LCD NEC the powers to accept or reject party‟s 
nominees for 2007‟. It is important to note among others the amendment had 
recommended that nominees should hold high academic qualifications. It is also 
interesting to observe most MPs who left the LCD to form the ABC did not 
posses any high academic qualifications and were likely not to make it to 
parliament with the LCD in 2007. As with other splits not discussed in the paper, 
the factions to emerge from these splits were at the centre of conflict after the 
1998 and 2007 general elections.  
 
The findings of the study have further indicated a failure of national institutions to 
run conflict-free elections and to amicably resolve electoral conflicts by others 
can be traced to the level of economic dependence the institutions have on the 
ruling party. This has intensified the occurrence of the neo-patrimonial 
tendencies in which the elites ensure support of the relevant institutions through 
provision of financial favours. For instance, the findings have shown that the 
respondents believe that the IEC commissioners have worked closely with the 
government in exchange for financial favours. As indicated in previous sections, 
IEC‟s commissioners were among those officials who benefited from government 
scheme that cheaply sold the cars to the officials. Earlier sections have also 
shown respondents‟ displeasure about an emerging trend that sees IEC 
commissioners posted to glamorous government positions after completing their 
allegedly controversy-riddled terms with the commission.     
 
Furthermore, the study proved questionable decisions made by the courts are 
spurred by some judges‟ economic gains from government in reciprocation for 
their rulings. For instance, it is common knowledge that judges are appointed by 
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the government of the day. On top of that, the judges have also been 
beneficiaries of controversial government vehicle scheme alongside politicians 
and other officials. Based on resultant bad publicity, the scheme attracted within 
the country, one can simply conclude the judges accepted the luxurious cars 
simply because they could hardly afford them because of their low salaries. After 
2009 salary increases, the highest paid judge, Chief Justice Mahapela Lehohla 
earns M374 748 annually (Public Eye, August 21 2009). It is, therefore, not 
difficult to understand his alleged involvement in judgments that fanned elections-
related conflicts.  
 
It would be difficult for judges to consider ethics ahead of financial gains under 
the Lesotho‟s salary structures. It becomes illogical to think of a judge making 
decisions against the wishes of a government that sells him a Mercedes Benz 
worth hundreds of thousands for a paltry M4 500. In 2006 the Minister of Tourism 
Lebohang Nt‟sinyi sold her M4 500 „worth‟ Mercedes Benz in Bloemfontein for 
more around M300 000 (Public Eye November 15 2006). This is more than 75% 
of the Chief Justice‟s salary.  
 
All other factors identified as causes of elections-related conflicts are secondary 
in nature and are mostly rooted in either of the main factors discussed above. 
Firstly, the use of abusive language by political leadership is in one way or 
another related to the congress / national polarity discussed earlier. Although 
gradually narrowing, the polarity remains wide differing party members view each 
other as enemies not be trusted under any circumstance. An example of this can 
be learnt from some statements made by the leader of the ruling party soon after 
the split that resulted in the birth of the ABC. The LCD leader always reminded 
his audiences the newly formed party would not last because it consisted of 
congress and nationalist orientated members who, according to him „were 
strange bedfellows‟ who would never work together‟. Whenever he used abusive 
language of which he was accused by the interviews of the study, the LCD leader 
never ceased to mention that the opposition are products of the nationalist 
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thinking, which to him was an anathema. The same could be said about former 
Prime Minister Jonathan who would regularly used derogatory language 
whenever he referred to BCP members. How this polarity breeds into conflict is 
captured by Makoa when he observes that: „the feeling among the Lesotho 
population is that going to the voting booths means going to defeat or vanquish 
political opponents‟ (1997: 22) 
 
While some respondents blamed election observers for playing a role in election-
related conflict, it has been difficult for me to draw a direct link between eruption 
of conflicts and the election observers. I found the problem lie not with observers 
but with political parties that failing to tackle domestic problems hoping election 
observers will do it on their behalf. Blame can also be placed on governments 
failing to implement observers‟ recommendations from time to time.  
 
No direct relationship could also be drawn between conflicts and electoral 
models. Electoral models have in many cases been used as a smokescreen for 
eruption of the conflict. In reality, this conflict had been caused not by the 
electoral models per say, but by manipulation of electoral models by the political 
elite who use any trick to ensure parliamentary dominance. The conflict is also 
attributable to a failure of losers to access economic benefits that come with 
being in parliament. It is logical to believe if they were on the winning side, those 
who blame the electoral models would be defending them. 
 
4.7. Recommendations on how to arrest the elections-related 
conflicts 
Generally, the respondents have unanimously agreed election-related conflict 
can be eradicated, or at least minimised. This, they said, can be achieved 
through the introduction of reforms in two different yet highly dependent 
directions – economy and political culture. The general feeling is that if economy 
could be transformed, politics would cease to be the only viable means of 
economic survival and elections would no longer be a matter of life and death as 
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it is today. People who fail to make the grade in politics would still find 
alternatives in the private sector. The transformation of the economy would also 
have a direct impact on the nation‟s political culture. The present culture of non-
tolerance between political rivals is to a greater extent a result of limited 
economic resources. Because of scarce resources, those in power do all they 
can to exclude rivals while those outside the structures of power try every trick to 
have access to these resources.  
 
It is important, however, to note that, important as it is, the transformation of the 
economy cannot become an automatic panacea for the country‟s election-related 
conflict. Experience has shown that even poor countries can manage to avoid 
election-related conflict. For instance, when it gained independence in 1966, 
Botswana was almost in the same poverty bracket as Lesotho. However, even 
during those years of weak economy, Botswana never suffered any serious 
election-related conflict such as the one rocking Lesotho. It would therefore be 
important to bear in mind that as efforts are being made to transform the 
economy – which is of vital importance, mechanisms are devised to complement 
such transformation by positive changes in political cultures. 
 
Based on the findings of the study, it is clear that even minor electoral grievances 
graduate into serious conflict because of lack of speedy resolutions. This mainly 
results from the backlog of cases in the High court of Lesotho where election-
related cases are heard. This necessitates the establishment of conflict 
mechanisms that will specifically be concerned with electoral matters. It is on the 
basis of this that I recommend that the country establishes an electoral court. 
This should not be difficult as the country has recently established a similar 
institution – the Commercial Court. If such an electoral court is finally established, 
the country should, however, involve all the stakeholders to make the court 
acceptable to all. The court should be established in a transparent manner 
inclusive to all stakeholders. This would help avoid controversy similar to one 
surrounding the establishment of the commercial court. Some sectors within the 
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legal fraternity, particularly legal practitioners are against the appointment of 
Justice John David Lyons of South Africa as the head of the court. Airing his view 
about the appointment of Justice Lyons, Advocate Thabang Khauoe stated that 
„the idea of a foreign judge manning the commercial court is an insult to the Law 
Society of Lesotho, which was never included in his identification and 
appointment‟ (Public Eye, February 5 – 11, 2010). It is therefore imperative that 
any efforts aimed at resolving conflicts be inclusive in order to have the required 
legitimacy. 
 
4.8 Closing Word 
Under normal circumstances elections are a peaceful means of changing or 
retaining a government. In these cases all citizens become concerned about 
during an electoral process is to make an influence through their votes. This, 
however, is not the case in Lesotho. Elections in Lesotho bring bad memories to 
those who are victims of election-related conflict, either physically or emotionally. 
What goes through the minds of many is how to stay out of the trouble usually 
following elections. Instead of generating excitement, in Lesotho, elections create 
fear and uncertainty. It is for this reason that political elite have to swallow 
whatever pride they may have and try to work together to make elections what 
they are supposed to be – a peaceful process of changing or retaining 
governments. 
 
This research has highlighted the country has to go through rapid transformation 
to eradicate, or at least minimise illegitimate conflict during elections. A 
transformation area, according to the findings of the research, includes 
transformation of the economy and development of political will by the political 
elite to put the interests of the country ahead of their own. While one does not 
think they are impossible to achieve, the transformation of the economy and the 
development of political will by the political elite in Lesotho poses a serious 
challenge. To be sure, this is not a new challenge, it has been obvious since 
independence the country needs economic development. It is, however, sad to 
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note the country has been regressing economically in recent years and it seems 
unlikely there will be any change soon. The country‟s political elite are more 
interested in capturing or retaining political positions, ensuring access to state 
resources. To political elite, economic development of the country lies secondary 
to personal own economic interests and those of their cronies. This has led to 
elections being a conflict-riddled scramble for national resources often 
characterised by violent conflict.  
 
Apart from the loss of life during the electoral process in Lesotho, the country has 
suffered drastic economic losses to what was already a weak economy in 1998. 
More than a decade after 1998, the country has not recovered; most towns 
remain shells. The challenge remains with the country‟s political leadership, to 
extract Lesotho from the economic and political rubble the country finds itself in. 
Transformation of the economy, establishment of an electoral court, and 
assurance of autonomy to political institutions such as the IEC will surely go a 
long way into stabilising the political environment and election-related conflict can 
be drastically reduced.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Electoral code of conduct: Lesotho 
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Appendix B: Interviewee consent form 
Consent Form 
 
Dear Sir/ Madam, 
 
With your signature at the bottom of this page, this form has the power to protect 
your autonomy. Please read it in full, and if you understand and agree, sign 
below. 
 
The purpose of this research is to establish what the real causes of elections-
related conflicts in Lesotho are, and what needs to be done to bring the conflicts 
to an end. Individually, you have been identified as a potential subject for this 
research because of your involvement/observation/mediation (delete whichever is 
inappropriate) in elections-related conflicts, and may have valuable insights for 
this study. All that is required from you is participation in this interview which 
should not last longer than sixty minutes. 
 
Please be advised that participation is voluntary and that all responses will be 
treated confidentially and only used for reference purposes; anonymity will be 
ensured where appropriate and there are no limits to confidentiality, unless you 
are willing to be named. This research will serve as a partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the MA Degree in Political Studies at the University of the 
Western Cape in Bellville, South Africa. The findings of the research will also be 
reported back to the participants. You are at liberty to withdraw from the research 
at any time without any negative or undesirable consequences to yourself. 
 
Yours faithfully 
 
Tlohang W Letsie 
Cell: 58722710 / 078 126 3403 
E-mail: 2963731@uwc.ac.za 
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I……………………………………………..(full names of the participant) hereby 
confirm that I understand the contents of this document and the nature of the 
research project, and I consent to participating in the research project. 
I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any, should I 
desire. 
 
SIGNATURE OF PARTICIPANT……………………………….. 
DATE………………………………  
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Appendix C: Names and occupations of the respondents who asked 
not to be anonymous, listed in order of alphabet 
 
1. Major General Justin Metsing Lekhanya: A former Head of Military 
government from 1986 to 1991. Currently leader of the BNP and an MP of 
the same party. 
2. Dr Faku Johnson Likoti: Formerly a mediator in Lesotho political conflicts, 
lecturer at the National University of Lesotho, and currently a 
commissioner at the Lesotho Independent Electoral Commission. 
3. Hon. Sello Clement Machakela: Former Minister in the Prime Minister‟s 
Office and currently ABC MP. 
4. Hon. Moeketse Vincent Malebo: A veteran politician. Former member of 
the IPA, and currently a leader and MP of the MFP. 
5. Rev. Rapelang Mokhahlane: Head of the Lesotho Evangelical Church 
(LEC), and long time mediator under the auspices of the Christian Council 
of Lesotho. 
6. Hon. Sephiri Enoch Motanyane: Former Minister of Justice, Secretary 
General of the LCD and currently LCD MP and a Deputy Speaker of the 
National Assembly. 
7. Dr Tefetso Henry Mothibe: Former Vice Chancellor of the National 
University of Lesotho (NUL), and now a Senior lecturer in the department 
of History. 
8. Mr. Nthakeng Pheello Selinyane: A senior lecturer in the department of 
Political and Administrative Studies at NUL, and a Politics and 
Development editor of the Public Eye newspaper. 
9. Mr. Mafole Sematlane: A former Commissioner of the IEC, a consultant 
working with IPA, and currently an independent consultant based in 
Maseru.  
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Appendix D: Interview schedule 
Major General Justin Metsing Lekhanya: July, 07 2009. BNP Centre 
Dr Faku Johnson Likoti: July, 14 2009. IEC 
Hon. Sello Clement Machakela. July, 09 2009. Khubetsoana 
Hon. Moeketse Vincent Malebo: July, 08 2009. Maseru West 
Rev. Rapelang Mokhahlane: July, 14 2009. Sefika LEC. 
Hon. Sephiri Enoch Motanyane: July, 06 2009. National Assembly 
Dr Tefetso Henry Mothibe: July, 08 2009. His Majesty‟s Office grounds. 
Mr. Nthakeng Pheello Selinyane: July, 03 2009. Sea-point 
Mr. Mafole Sematlane:  July, 02 2009. Sea-point 
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Appendix E: Interview questionnaire 
 
Why, in your opinion are Lesotho’s elections usually characterised by conflicts? 
 
What is the role of each of the following, if any, in the brewing and sustaining of 
election-related conflicts? 
 
Political parties, both ruling and opposition? 
 
Electoral models? 
 
IEC? 
 
Election observers? 
 
Courts of law? 
 
What’s your opinion on the view that the weak economy is a factor in the conflicts? 
 
Is there any other factor that in your view has been omitted which contributes to the 
emergence of election-related conflicts?   
 
What, in your view needs to be done to prevent the election-related conflict 
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